An Empirical Research in Accounting Policy after the Japanese Bubble Economy

本文旨在研究日本企业选择会计方法的原因和动机及其过程，并提出其会计选择背后的经济和会计含义。为了构建研究假设，我们对1998年以前日本和美国有关会计政策的论文进行了研究，发现了现有假设中存在的一些问题。在最后一年，即1998年，从1990年股票暴跌年和1994年之后四年的财务报表中，手工选择了公司持有证券和退休津贴的会计处理方法，并描述性地分析了日本公司的会计自由裁量行为。虽然最后的实证检验仍在进行中，但公司经理被期望管理会计权责发生制，即现金流量与报告收入数字之间的差异，并操纵报告收入。实证检验的结果支持盈余管理假说，即公司管理者应计收益递减。除了提供公司管理者管理盈余的证据外，本研究的结果可能对会计研究者有用。

This paper aims to examine reasons and incentives for Japanese firms' choice in accounting methods and the process of it, and to propose the economic and accounting implication behind their accounting choice. To construct the research hypothesis, the Japanese and the U.S.papers related to accounting policies were explored and some problems in the existing hypotheses were found before the 1998 year. In the last year, namely 1998, accounting methods for securities held in the firm and allowances for retirement payment are hand-selected from the financial statements as for the stock crush year of 1990 and the four later year of 1994, and the accounting discretionary behavior of Japanese firms are descriptively analyzed. Although the final empirical test is ongoing, corporate manager are expected to manage the accounting accrual, that are the difference between cash flows and reported income numbers, and manipulate the reported income.The result of the empirical tests support the earnings management hypothesis suggesting that corporate managers make income-decreasing accruals. In addition to providing evidence that corporate managers manage earnings, the results of this study may prove useful to accounting researchers.