Logical and Philosophical Study Concerning the Structure of the Causal Inference about Actions

本研究计划的中心主题是了解有关行为的因果推理结构。为了从哲学上分析人的行为，现代哲学家通常采用戴维森的分析方法。本研究试图检验和探讨这种有争议的分析类型，特别是所谓的副词掉落推理问题。问题的关键在于：(1)戴维森分析没有考虑行动和事件的个性化水平，(2)它不能很好地描述行动句子。本课题取得的主要成果如下：(1)脱副词推理并没有将副词从修饰句中脱去，而只是对修饰句进行了概括。然后，它的副词只是代替描述，更一般地解释相关的行动。(2)在因果陈述中，一个作为原因的行为和另一个作为结果的行为通过它们对一定条件的满足而形成因果关系。所以，如果条件是一般化的，因果关系本身就不能成立。因为他们不能满足条件。(3)要自然地进行因果句的落副词推理，就必须用相关动作句的个性化图很好地描述因果关系的一般条件。

The central theme of this research project is to understand the structure of causal reasoning concerning actions. To analyze human actions philosophically modern philosophers usually use Davidsonian way of analysis. This research attempted to examine and investigate this controversial type of analysis, especially the problem of so-called adverb-dropping inference. It is the points of issue are that (1)Davidsonian analysis does not consider the level of individuation of actions and events, and (2)it can not describe the action sentences well.The main result obtained by this project is the following.(1) The adverb-dropping inference does not drop its adverb from the modified sentence, but only generalizes its sentence . Then its adverb is merely substituted for the description which explains relevant action more generally.(2) In the causal statements, one action as a cause and other action as an effect make a causal relation by their fulfillment of a certain condition. So, if the condition is generalized, the causal relation itself cannot hold. Because they cannot fulfill the condition.(3) To make an adverb-dropping inferences by causal sentences naturally it is necessary that we describe the generalized condition of the causal relation well by the individuation diagram of relevant action sentences.