Theoretical and Empirical Analysis on Labor Market and Related Policies from the Viewpoint of Game Theory

本文以博弈论为主要工具分析了战略劳动力供给。我们的基本观点是，工人和企业都是通过观察工资分配、税收和其他影响个人收入的制度来采取战略行动的，工人和企业都是为了实现长期利益最大化。在项目的第一年。我们开发了一个游戏模型，在这个模型中，企业试图建立良好的声誉来降低离职率，而员工在不确定的情况下寻找更好的工作。我们还考虑了日本的一种特殊情况，即配偶的收入影响主要收入者的减税。在这些模型中，劳动力供给不仅取决于工资（价格），还取决于战略考虑。我们收集了美国和日本劳动者个体劳动力供给行为的数据。在项目的第二年，我们测试了我们的战略劳动力市场模型。这一结果有力地支持了劳动力供给不完全取决于工资（价格）的观点。从美国的数据分析中，我们发现企业规模分布对劳动力流动的影响更大。因此，员工会对公司的规模所反映的声誉做出反应。从日本的数据分析中，我们发现妻子通过调整自己的劳动力供给来减少丈夫的所得税。我们还发表了基于相同理论模型的挪威数据分析。Takako Fujiwara-Greve和Henrich Greve(2000)，“组织生态与工作流动性”，《社会力量》第79期，第547-568页。其他的分析也在手稿中进行了总结，如：明林秀夫《日本妻子如何应对配偶津贴？》劳动供给的结构性估计与单一家庭模型的检验[j] .庆应义塾大学。我们的模型是全新的，因为游戏结构允许自愿改变合作伙伴，这是之前没有分析过的。我们的实证结果在以下意义上是重要的：(i)我们发现了强有力的证据，证明劳动力供给是战略性的，外部机会和制度很重要（不像基于工资的简单供给函数）。（二）对单一制家庭理论提出质疑。少

We analyzed strategic labor supply using game theory as one of the main tools. Our basic idea is that both workers and firms behave strategically by looking at the wage distribution and tax and other institutions that affect one's income, and that workers and firm maximize lone-term benefits. In the first year of the project. we developed a game model in which firms try to build good reputations to reduce turnover rate and workers search for better jobs under uncertainty. We also considered a special situation in Japan where spouses income influences the main earners' tax reduction. In these models, labor supply is determined not only by the wage (price) but also by strategic concern. We collected US and Japanese data on individual workers' labor supply behavior.In the second year of the project we tested our strategic labor market model. The results strongly support that labor supply is not solely based on the wage (price). From US data analysis, we found that firm size distribution a … More ffects labor mobility. Thus workers react to firms' reputation signaled by the size. From Japanese data analysis, we found that wives adjust their labor supply to reduce husband's income tax. We also published an analysis from Norwegian data based on the same theoretical model. Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Henrich Greve (2000) "Organizational Ecology and Job Mobility" Social Forces 79 (2) : 547-568. Other analyses are also summarized in manuscripts such as : Hideo Akabayashi "How do Japanese Wives Respond to the Allowance for Spouses? A Structural Estimate of Labor Supply and a Test of Unitary Household Model" mimeo Keio University.Our model is new in the sense that the game structure allows voluntary partner changes which has not been analyzed before. Our empirical results are significant in the sense that (i) we found strong evidence that labor supply is strategic and outside opportunities and institutions matter (not like a simple supply function based on wages). and (ii) it casts doubt on unitary household theory. Less