Theoretical and Empirical Analysis on Labor Market and Related Policies from the Viewpoint of Game Theory

我们以博弈论为主要工具对战略性劳动力供给进行了分析。我们的基本观点是，工人和公司都通过关注工资分配、税收和其他影响收入的制度来进行战略性行为，工人和公司最大化长期利益。在项目的第一年。我们建立了一个博弈模型，在这个模型中，企业试图建立良好的声誉，以降低离职率，员工在不确定的情况下寻找更好的工作。我们还考虑了日本的一种特殊情况，即配偶收入影响主要收入者的减税。在这些模型中，劳动力供给不仅取决于工资(价格)，还取决于战略考虑。我们收集了美国和日本关于单个工人的劳动力供应行为的数据。在项目的第二年，我们测试了我们的战略劳动力市场模型。这一结果有力地支持了劳动力供给不是单纯基于工资(价格)的观点。从美国的数据分析中，我们发现公司规模分布为…更多地影响劳动力流动。因此，工人们会对公司的声誉做出反应，这一点从规模上看就很明显。从日本的数据分析中，我们发现，妻子通过调整劳动力供给来降低丈夫的所得税。我们还发表了一项基于相同理论模型的挪威数据分析。藤原隆子和亨利希·格雷夫(2000)<组织生态学和工作流动>《社会力量》79(2)：547-568。其他分析也被总结在手稿中，如：Hideo Akabayashi《日本妻子如何应对配偶津贴？劳动力供应的结构性估计和单位家庭模型的检验》Mimeo Keio University。我们的模型是新的，因为博弈结构允许自愿改变伴侣，这是以前从未分析过的。我们的实证结果具有重要意义，因为(I)我们发现了强有力的证据，表明劳动力供给是战略性的，外部机会和制度是重要的(不像简单的基于工资的供给函数)。以及(Ii)对单一家庭理论的质疑。较少

We analyzed strategic labor supply using game theory as one of the main tools. Our basic idea is that both workers and firms behave strategically by looking at the wage distribution and tax and other institutions that affect one's income, and that workers and firm maximize lone-term benefits. In the first year of the project. we developed a game model in which firms try to build good reputations to reduce turnover rate and workers search for better jobs under uncertainty. We also considered a special situation in Japan where spouses income influences the main earners' tax reduction. In these models, labor supply is determined not only by the wage (price) but also by strategic concern. We collected US and Japanese data on individual workers' labor supply behavior.In the second year of the project we tested our strategic labor market model. The results strongly support that labor supply is not solely based on the wage (price). From US data analysis, we found that firm size distribution a … More ffects labor mobility. Thus workers react to firms' reputation signaled by the size. From Japanese data analysis, we found that wives adjust their labor supply to reduce husband's income tax. We also published an analysis from Norwegian data based on the same theoretical model. Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Henrich Greve (2000) "Organizational Ecology and Job Mobility" Social Forces 79 (2) : 547-568. Other analyses are also summarized in manuscripts such as : Hideo Akabayashi "How do Japanese Wives Respond to the Allowance for Spouses? A Structural Estimate of Labor Supply and a Test of Unitary Household Model" mimeo Keio University.Our model is new in the sense that the game structure allows voluntary partner changes which has not been analyzed before. Our empirical results are significant in the sense that (i) we found strong evidence that labor supply is strategic and outside opportunities and institutions matter (not like a simple supply function based on wages). and (ii) it casts doubt on unitary household theory. Less