权益分类	功能权益	普通用户	{{item.name}}会员
{{category.name}}	{{benefitItem.name}}

Theoretical and Empirical Analysis on Labor Market and Related Policies from the Viewpoint of Game Theory

博弈论视角下劳动力市场及相关政策的理论与实证分析

基本信息

批准号：
11630017
负责人：
GREVE Takako
金额：
$ 2.05万
依托单位：
Keio University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
1999
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
1999 至 2000
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-11630017/
关键词：
Labor Game Theory Data Expectation Reputation Household Tax ゲームジョブサーチ賃金戦略

项目摘要

We analyzed strategic labor supply using game theory as one of the main tools. Our basic idea is that both workers and firms behave strategically by looking at the wage distribution and tax and other institutions that affect one's income, and that workers and firm maximize lone-term benefits. In the first year of the project. we developed a game model in which firms try to build good reputations to reduce turnover rate and workers search for better jobs under uncertainty. We also considered a special situation in Japan where spouses income influences the main earners' tax reduction. In these models, labor supply is determined not only by the wage (price) but also by strategic concern. We collected US and Japanese data on individual workers' labor supply behavior.In the second year of the project we tested our strategic labor market model. The results strongly support that labor supply is not solely based on the wage (price). From US data analysis, we found that firm size distribution a … More ffects labor mobility. Thus workers react to firms' reputation signaled by the size. From Japanese data analysis, we found that wives adjust their labor supply to reduce husband's income tax. We also published an analysis from Norwegian data based on the same theoretical model. Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Henrich Greve (2000) "Organizational Ecology and Job Mobility" Social Forces 79 (2) : 547-568. Other analyses are also summarized in manuscripts such as : Hideo Akabayashi "How do Japanese Wives Respond to the Allowance for Spouses? A Structural Estimate of Labor Supply and a Test of Unitary Household Model" mimeo Keio University.Our model is new in the sense that the game structure allows voluntary partner changes which has not been analyzed before. Our empirical results are significant in the sense that (i) we found strong evidence that labor supply is strategic and outside opportunities and institutions matter (not like a simple supply function based on wages). and (ii) it casts doubt on unitary household theory. Less

本文以博弈论为主要工具，对战略性劳动力供给进行了分析。我们的基本思想是，工人和企业都通过观察工资分配、税收和其他影响收入的制度来进行战略性行为，工人和企业都能使长期利益最大化。在项目的第一年。我们建立了一个博弈模型，其中企业试图建立良好的声誉，以减少流动率和工人寻找更好的工作，在不确定性。我们还考虑了日本的一种特殊情况，即配偶收入影响主要收入者的减税。在这些模型中，劳动力供给不仅由工资（价格）决定，而且还由战略考虑决定。我们收集了美国和日本的劳动者个体劳动力供给行为的数据，在项目的第二年，我们测试了我们的战略劳动力市场模型。这一结果有力地支持了劳动力供给不完全取决于工资（价格）的观点。从美国的数据分析，我们发现，企业规模分布， ...更多信息影响劳动力流动。因此，工人们会对公司规模所体现的声誉做出反应。从日本的数据分析，我们发现，妻子调整自己的劳动力供给，以减少丈夫的所得税。我们还发表了基于相同理论模型的挪威数据分析。Takako Fujiwara-Greve and Henrich Greve（2000）. Organizational Ecology and Job Mobility. Social Forces 79（2）：547-568.其他的分析也被总结在手稿中，如：Hideo Akabayashi“日本妻子如何应对配偶津贴？劳动供给的结构性估计和单一家庭模型的检验”。我们的模型是新的，因为游戏结构允许以前没有分析过的自愿合作伙伴的变化。我们的实证结果在以下意义上是重要的：（i）我们发现了强有力的证据，表明劳动力供给是战略性的，外部机会和制度很重要（不像基于工资的简单供给函数）。二是对单一家庭理论的质疑。少