Studies in the Access Pricing in Regulated Industries

在《管制产业中的古诺竞争与准入定价》一文中，我们分析了一个经济均衡，其中最终市场中的一个生产者是所有者和竞争者双方所需投入的垄断性供应者，并且垄断定价行为受到管制。本文的两个主要目的是(I)研究进入者的最终产品的价格与上游供应商的边际成本相比应该高到什么程度，(Ii)检验鲍莫-威廉有效成分定价规则(ECPR)，该规则规定接入费用应该大致由以下公式设定：最优接入费用=提供接入的直接成本提供接入的机会成本。我们关注的是，垄断者的产品质量可能与进入者的产品质量不同。我们还研究了进入者扮演古诺寡头垄断者的情况，以及他们扮演价格接受者的情况。首先，我们并不像以前的大多数研究那样假设下游企业的利润为零。我们讨论了我们的分析如何与文献中的已知结果相关联。在随附的论文《关于次优时福利变化的度量》中，我们推导了由于放宽模型的扭曲约束而引起的福利变化的公式。

In the paper "Cournot competition and access pricing in regulated industries" we analyzed the equilibrium of an economy where one of the producers in the final market is the monopolistic supplier of input needed by both its owner and competitors, and monopoly pricing behavior of the firm is regulated. Two major objectives of this paper are (i) to study how high should the price of the entrant's final product be compared with the marginal cost of the upstream supplier, and in relation to it, (ii) to examine Baumol-Willig efficient component pricing rule (ECPR) which states that the access charge should be set roughly by the formula : optimal access charge=direct cost of providing access+opportunity cost of providing access.The problem has been studied in various settings. We were concerned with the case where the quality of the monopolist's product may be different from the entrants'. We also studied case where entrants act as Cournot oligopolists as well as the case where they behave as price takers. We do not assume, to begin with, that profits of downstream firms are zero as most previous studies did. We discussed how our analysis relates to the known results in the literature.In the accompanying paper "On the measurement of welfare changes at second best optima" we derived formulae for the change in the welfare caused by the relaxation of the distortionary constraint of the model.