Welfare Analysis of Network Public Utility Industries : A Real Options Approach

本研究的目的是对电力、电信、天然气等网络型公用事业行业进行福利分析，通过一个真实的期权方法。该研究项目所作的贡献载于以下两份文件。在接入定价规则下本地网络所有者的合作投资本文研究了网络所有者之间的竞争环境。研究了在基于接入成本的接入定价下，它们投资网络设施的战略机会，并对合作投资机制和非合作投资机制进行了比较。分析建议的政策组合之间的接入定价和投资制度，以实现理想的网络产业环境。当接入定价包含较高（较低）的接入成本比例水平时，合作投资体制比非合作投资体制获得较高（较低）的社会福利.从入口到旁路：本文研究了不确定性条件下网络型产业中企业不可逆投资的激励机制。我们的特点是进入者的战略选择方面的接入费溢价和增量利润流从获得旁路。结果表明，在网络产业中引入竞争有助于提高消费者福利的意义上说，进入的时间变得更早的竞争比没有竞争。此外，我们确保允许有机会访问现有的网络设施，使进入者的激励，以建立一个旁路弱。最后讨论了接入费对投资的影响。

The purpose of the research project is to provide a welfare analysis of network public utility industries, like electricity, telecommunication, natural gas, etc., through a real options approach. The contributions made by the research project are presented in the following two papers.1. Cooperative investment of local network owners under an access pricing ruleThis paper examines a competitive environment among network owners. It studies their strategic opportunities to invest in network facility under access pricing based on access costs, and then compares a cooperative investment regime with a non-cooperative investment regime. The analysis recommends a policy mix between the access pricing and the investment regime to achieve a desirable network-industry environment. When the access pricing involves a higher (lower) proportion level of access costs, the cooperative investment regime achieves higher (lower) social welfare than the non-cooperative investment regime.2. From access to bypass : a real options approachThis paper examines firms' incentives for irreversible investments in network industries under uncertainty. We characterize an entrant's strategy choice in terms of an access charge premium and an incremental profit flow accrued from access to bypass. It is shown that an introduction of competition in network industries contributes to an enhancement of consumer welfare in the sense that the timing of entry becomes earlier with competition than without competition. In addition, we ensure that allowing the opportunity to have access to an incumbent's network facility makes an entrant's incentive to construct a bypass weak. The effect of access charge on the investment is also discussed.