Cross-Country Studies on the Effectiveness of Market Discipline to Banks

本研究由三个部分组成。第一部分对存款人选择银行的条件以及存款人选择银行对银行管理者风险承担行为的影响进行了理论分析。我强调，救助政策使市场纪律失效，助长了银行经理的冒险行为。在第二部分中，我研究了日本在1994年代的存款人行为，发现存款人在存款增长率和存款利率方面都是根据银行风险来选择银行的。定期存款增长率与银行风险的相关性在2002年重新引入保险限额之前有所增强。在第三部分中，在对现有国别研究进行调查之后，我提出了与Hiroko Iwaki和Tsuru Kotaro进行的跨国分析。我们构建了63个国家的18000个银行年度数据和银行监管数据。利用这一数据集，我们发现，随着银行监管和法治的薄弱以及金融体系的欠发达，存款人的风险敏感性增加。这一结果与“代表性假设”是一致的，即监管机构作为存款人的代表来监管银行。

This study is composed of three parts.In Part I, I conduct theoretical analyses on what conditions depositors select banks and how depositors' selection of banks affects bank managers' risk-taking behavior. I stress that bailout policy nullifies market discipline and promotes bank managers' risk taking behavior.In Part II, I study Japanese depositors' behavior during the 1994s and find that depositors selected banks according to bank risk both in terms of deposit growth rates and deposit interest rates. The correlation of the growth rates of time deposits and bank risk increased just before the coverage limit was reintroduced in 2002.In Part III, following surveys on the existing country studies, I present cross-country analyses conducted with Hiroko Iwaki and Tsuru Kotaro. We constructed 18,000 bank-year data across 63 countries and bank regulation data. Using this data set, we find that depositors' risk sensitivity increases as bank regulation and rule of law are weak and financial system is less developed. This result is consistent with the "representative hypothesis," positing that regulatory bodies supervise banks as a representative of depositors.