Changes in Political leadership and Their Influence over Foreign Policy Making Process : a Comparative Study

本研究的基本目的是了解政治领导人的变化会以何种方式和在何种程度上影响外交政策的制定过程。为了比较不同政府对基本相同的外交政策问题的态度，我们选择了20世纪60年代英国连续三届政府对可能加入欧洲经济共同体问题的态度作为研究对象。本文的主要结论如下：第一，通过考察麦克米伦政府在1959-1963年间对加入欧共体的态度，得出结论：在第一次申请加入欧共体之前和布鲁塞尔谈判期间，政治领导人，特别是首相本人对最终申请加入欧共体的承诺，在决定英国对欧共体政策的过程中起着至关重要的作用。加入欧共体谈判破裂后，首相本人显然对加入欧共体失去了兴趣，但强有力的政治指导仍然存在。 ...更多信息 其次，通过考察1963-1964年道格拉斯-霍姆政府对加入欧共体的态度，得出的结论是，领导层的更迭并没有引起英国对欧共体政策的实质性变化。首相对欧洲经济共同体的成员资格没有表现出浓厚的兴趣，似乎接受了法国总统戴高乐将军对英国成员资格的否决是不可逾越的事实。相反，道格拉斯-霍姆更关心的是重振英国与英联邦的联系，尽管这似乎更多地源于他对政府需要提高传统保守党选票的选举支持率的担忧，而不是真正相信英联邦是英国全球战略的重要支柱。因此，道格拉斯-霍姆政府的欧共体政策基本上沿袭了上届政府的路线，对欧共体未来态度的政策规划主要由外交部、财政部等有关部门的高级官员进行。第三，通过考察1964 - 1966年威尔逊政府对欧共体成员资格的态度，分析了威尔逊政府对欧共体成员资格的态度。得出的结论是，政治领导层的变化确实使英国对欧共体的政策发生了深刻的变化，至少在新政府的初期是这样的：追求双边基础上的职能合作，特别强调英法在飞机和其他高科技工业方面的合作，促进英联邦贸易的努力，强调英国在欧洲以外的军事承诺，为欧洲自由贸易联盟-欧洲经济共同体合作的“桥梁建设”倡议，等等--这些都是保守党政府在布鲁塞尔谈判破裂后被排除在外或没有认真考虑的措施和倡议。尽管外交部和财政部等主要政府部门之间存在既定的政策共识，但新政府的想法不同，行动也不同。这些都是在内阁高级成员，特别是首相本人的坚持下采取的行动。考虑到工党政府在议会中只占少数，这些近-英国经济共同体政策的定义应被视为政治领导层的强大影响力所带来的重大政策变化，尽管这些努力都被证明是徒劳的，而且官僚们之间现有的政策共识被首相本人视为唯一可行的政策选择。1966年大选。少

The basic aim of this research was to understand in what ways and to what extent a change of political leadership can influence foreign policy making process In order to make a comparison between attitudes of different governments over basically the same foreign policy issue, we chose as a subject of study the attitudes of three successive British governments during the 1960s towards the question of possible EEC membership. The summary of conclusion is as follows :Firstly, by examining the Macmillan Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1959-1963, it was concluded that the role of political leadership, especially the Prime Minister's own commitment towards eventual application for EEC membership was paramount in deciding the course of British policy towards EEC before the 1st application and during the Brussels negotiations After the breakdown of membership negotiations, the Prime Minister himself apparently lost interest in this issue, but strong political guidance was … More continued to be given from Edward Heath, the minister responsible for European mattersSecondly, by examining the Douglas-Home Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1963-1964, it was concluded that the change of leadership caused no substantial change in British policy towards EEC. The Prime Minister showed no profound interest in the issued EEC membership, seemingly resigned to the fact that the French President General de Gaulle's veto over British membership was insurmountable Instead, Douglas-Home was concerned more over the need to reinvigorate Britain's links with the Commonwealth, although it seemed to have derived more from his concern over the government's need to boost electoral support from traditional Conservative votes rather than from genuine belief in the role of Commonwealth as an important pillar of Britain's world-wide strategy. Accordingly, the EEC policy of Douglas-Home government followed basically the course laid down under the previous government, and the policy-planning for the future attitude towards EEC was mostly conducted by senior officials of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and other departments concerned.Thirdly, by examining the Wilson Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 19641966, it was concluded that a change in political leadership did produce a profound change in Britain's policy towards EEC, at least during the initial phase of the new government Pursuit of functional co-operation on bilateral basis with special emphasis on Anglo-French collaboration in aircraft and other hi-tech industries, efforts to promote Commonwealth trade, emphasis on Britain's military commitment outside Europe, a "bridge-building" initiative for EFTA-EEC cooperation, etc. - these are all measures and initiatives which had been ruled out or had not been given serious consideration by Conservative governments during the period after the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations. The new government thought differently and tried to act differently, despite the presence of established policy consensus among major governmental departments such as the Foreign Office and the Treasury. And these were moves made at the insistence of senior members of the Cabinet, especially the Prime Minister himself. Considering the fact that the Labour government had only a fraction of majority in the Parliament, these near re-definition of British EEC policy should be regarded as a major policy change brought about by the strong influence of political leadership although these efforts all proved to be futile and the existing policy consensus among the bureaucrats came to be regarded by the Prime Minister himself as the only viable policy alternative by the time of 1966 general election. Less