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Changes in Political leadership and Their Influence over Foreign Policy Making Process : a Comparative Study

政治领导层的变化及其对外交政策制定过程的影响:比较研究

基本信息

批准号：
17530125
负责人：
MASUDA Minoru
金额：
$ 2.04万
依托单位：
Mie University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2005
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2005 至 2007
项目状态：
已结题

来源：
https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-17530125/
关键词：
British Policy towards EEC Harold Macmillan Alec Douglas-Home Harold Wilson 1st British Application for EEC membership ダグラス=ヒューム政権ウィルソン大西洋経済外交 FTA構想第一次EEC加盟申請ヒューム政権

项目摘要

The basic aim of this research was to understand in what ways and to what extent a change of political leadership can influence foreign policy making process In order to make a comparison between attitudes of different governments over basically the same foreign policy issue, we chose as a subject of study the attitudes of three successive British governments during the 1960s towards the question of possible EEC membership. The summary of conclusion is as follows :Firstly, by examining the Macmillan Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1959-1963, it was concluded that the role of political leadership, especially the Prime Minister's own commitment towards eventual application for EEC membership was paramount in deciding the course of British policy towards EEC before the 1st application and during the Brussels negotiations After the breakdown of membership negotiations, the Prime Minister himself apparently lost interest in this issue, but strong political guidance was … More continued to be given from Edward Heath, the minister responsible for European mattersSecondly, by examining the Douglas-Home Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 1963-1964, it was concluded that the change of leadership caused no substantial change in British policy towards EEC. The Prime Minister showed no profound interest in the issued EEC membership, seemingly resigned to the fact that the French President General de Gaulle's veto over British membership was insurmountable Instead, Douglas-Home was concerned more over the need to reinvigorate Britain's links with the Commonwealth, although it seemed to have derived more from his concern over the government's need to boost electoral support from traditional Conservative votes rather than from genuine belief in the role of Commonwealth as an important pillar of Britain's world-wide strategy. Accordingly, the EEC policy of Douglas-Home government followed basically the course laid down under the previous government, and the policy-planning for the future attitude towards EEC was mostly conducted by senior officials of the Foreign Office, the Treasury and other departments concerned.Thirdly, by examining the Wilson Government's attitude towards EEC membership between 19641966, it was concluded that a change in political leadership did produce a profound change in Britain's policy towards EEC, at least during the initial phase of the new government Pursuit of functional co-operation on bilateral basis with special emphasis on Anglo-French collaboration in aircraft and other hi-tech industries, efforts to promote Commonwealth trade, emphasis on Britain's military commitment outside Europe, a "bridge-building" initiative for EFTA-EEC cooperation, etc. - these are all measures and initiatives which had been ruled out or had not been given serious consideration by Conservative governments during the period after the breakdown of the Brussels negotiations. The new government thought differently and tried to act differently, despite the presence of established policy consensus among major governmental departments such as the Foreign Office and the Treasury. And these were moves made at the insistence of senior members of the Cabinet, especially the Prime Minister himself. Considering the fact that the Labour government had only a fraction of majority in the Parliament, these near re-definition of British EEC policy should be regarded as a major policy change brought about by the strong influence of political leadership although these efforts all proved to be futile and the existing policy consensus among the bureaucrats came to be regarded by the Prime Minister himself as the only viable policy alternative by the time of 1966 general election. Less

本研究的基本目的是了解政治领导层的变化以何种方式和在多大程度上影响外交政策制定过程。为了比较不同政府对基本相同的外交政策问题的态度，我们选择了20世纪60年代连续三届英国政府对可能的欧洲经济共同体成员资格问题的态度作为研究主题。结论概要如下：首先，通过审查1959-1963年麦克米伦政府对加入欧洲经济共同体的态度，得出结论认为，政治领导的作用，特别是首相本人对最终申请加入欧洲经济共同体的承诺，在第一次申请加入欧洲经济共同体之前和加入欧洲经济共同体谈判破裂后的布鲁塞尔谈判期间，在决定英国对欧洲经济共同体的政策走向方面发挥了至关重要的作用。首相本人显然对这个问题失去了兴趣，但强有力的政治指导是……负责欧洲事务的大臣爱德华·希思继续给予更多的指导。其次，通过考察道格拉斯-霍姆政府在1963-1964年间对加入欧洲经济共同体的态度，得出的结论是，领导层的更迭并没有导致英国对欧洲经济共同体的政策发生实质性变化。首相对欧洲经济共同体的成员资格并没有表现出浓厚的兴趣，他似乎认为法国总统戴高乐将军对英国成员资格的否决是不可克服的，这一事实是无可奈何的。相反，道格拉斯-霍姆更关心的是重振英国与英联邦的联系。尽管这似乎更多地源于他对政府需要提高传统保守党选票支持的担忧，而不是真正相信英联邦是英国全球战略的重要支柱。因此，道格拉斯-霍姆政府的欧共体政策基本沿袭了上届政府的路线，未来对欧共体态度的政策规划主要由外交部、财政部等有关部门的高级官员进行。第三，通过考察威尔逊政府在1964年至1966年间对加入欧共体的态度，得出的结论是，政治领导层的变化确实使英国对欧共体的政策发生了深刻的变化，至少在新政府的初始阶段是这样的。新政府追求双边基础上的功能性合作，特别强调英法在飞机和其他高科技产业方面的合作，努力促进英联邦贸易。强调英国在欧洲以外的军事承诺，欧洲自由贸易联盟-欧洲经济共同体合作的“桥梁”倡议等等，这些都是保守党政府在布鲁塞尔谈判破裂后的一段时间里被排除在外或没有认真考虑的措施和倡议。尽管外交部和财政部等主要政府部门已经达成了既定的政策共识，但新政府的想法和行动都有所不同。这些举措都是在内阁高级成员，尤其是首相本人的坚持下做出的。考虑到工党政府在议会中只有一小部分的多数席位，这些近乎重新定义的英国欧共体政策应该被视为政治领导层强大影响力带来的重大政策变化，尽管这些努力都被证明是徒劳的，官僚之间现有的政策共识在1966年大选时被首相本人视为唯一可行的政策选择。少