Research on Local Public Economics : with Focus on Capital Tax Competition

在此期间，我撰写了两篇研究论文：（1）税收竞争中的进入;（2）税收竞争下的再分配与区域发展。(1)（1）的目的是考察竞争地区数量内生时税收竞争的后果。Zodrow和Mieszkowski（1986年，《城市经济学杂志》）等标准税收竞争模型表明，当固定数量的地区竞争移动的税基时，税率和公共支出水平太低。（1）认为，这一标准论点适用于内生地区进入。为了确定竞争商业投资的地区数量，将土地开发的固定成本引入公共投入提供的Zodrow-Mieszkowski模型。在这个框架中，可以看出，从竞争商业投资的“活跃”地区之间的对称均衡开始，公共投入提供水平的均匀增加， ...更多信息 这意味着供给水平在均衡中是低效率的。本文正在审查中，以发表在“国际税收和公共财政”。在兵库县立大学和名古屋大学举行的研讨会上，以及在日本公共财政协会2007年年会（明治大学）上，也报告了这一情况。(2)在许多国家和邦，区域发展政策被用作区域再分配的手段，即使为此目的可以进行直接转移。在（2）中，从扭曲税收竞争的角度对这种政策做法提供了一种可能的解释。具体而言，本文考虑资本税竞争如何影响转移和发展政策，在地区收入差距的存在。在每个国家，发展政策决定了（不）从事生产活动的富（穷）区的数量，而转移政策则在富（穷）区之间重新分配收入。在税收竞争的情况下，转让和发展政策的组合效率低下：以均衡税率为条件，用于发展政策的收入过多，用于转让政策的收入过少。对支出组合的这种分析意味着，在分配特定税收用于区域再分配时，竞争国家过于重视通过发展政策减少贫穷地区的数量，而不是将收入从富裕地区转移到贫穷地区。此外，研究显示，由于过度发展的可能性，公共开支的整体水平可能过高。在目前的发展政策规范下，标准的供给不足结果并不一定成立。我在立命馆大学、名古屋大学和京都大学的研讨会上报告了这篇论文。该论文于2008年5月5日在《城市经济学杂志》上发表（doi：10.1016/j.jue.2008.05.002）。从5月9日起，它可以在Elsevier主页上在线访问。少

During the term of this subsidized project, I wrote two research papers :(1) Entry in Tax Competition ; (2) Redistribution and Regional Development under Tax Competition.(1) The purpose of (1) is an investigation of the consequence of tax competition when the number of competing regions is endogenous. The standard tax competition models such as Zodrow and Mieszkowski (the 1986, Journal of Urban Economics) have shown that tax rates and public expenditure levels are too low when a fixed number of regions compete for mobile tax bases. What (1) argues is that this standard argument goes through with endogenous region entry. To determine the number of regions that compete for business investment, a fixed cost of land development is introduced into the Zodrow-Mieszkowski model of public input provision. In this framework, it is shown that, starting from a symmetric equilibrium among "active" regions that compete for business investment, a uniform increase in the level of public input provisi … More on raises the aggregate income of all regions, implying that the provision level is inefficiently low in the equilibrium.This paper is under review for publication in "International Tax and Public Finance". It was also reported at seminars held at Hyogo Prefecture University and Nagoya University, and at the annual meeting of the Japanese association of public finance in 2007 (at Meiji University).(2) Regional development policies are used as a means of regional redistribution in many countries and states, even if direct transfers are available for this purpose. In (2), a possible explanation for this policy practice is provided in terms of distorting tax competition. Specifically, the paper considers how capital tax competition affects transfer and development policies in the presence of regional income disparity. In each country, development policies determine the number of rich (poor) regions that (do not) engage in production activities, while transfer policies redistribute income between rich and poor regions. The mix of transfer and development policies is inefficient under tax competition: conditional on the equilibrium tax rate, too much revenue is spent on development policies and too little on transfer policies. This analysis of the expenditure mix implies that when allocating a given tax revenue for regional redistribution, competing countries attach too much importance to reducing the number of poor regions through development policies, rather than transferring income from rich to poor regions. Moreover, it is shown that the overall level of public expenditure may be too high because of the possibility of over-development. Under the present specification of development policies, the standard under-provision result does not necessarily hold.I reported this paper at the seminars held at Ritsumeikan University, Nagoya University and Kyoto University. The paper was accepted for publication in the Journal of Urban Economics on 5 May 2008 (doi: 10.1016/j.jue.2008.05.002). From 9 May, it is available online in the Elsevier Homepage. Less