Institutional Resilience and Changes of the Korean Constitutions : With Focus on Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institution

点击翻译按钮获取中文摘要

This study is aimed at explaining the variations of institutional resilience and changes of the past Korean Constitutions in more than 60 years (1948-2010) by focusing on institutional equilibrium and equilibrium institution in new institutionalism. This study shows that the dynamics of institutional resilience and changes (equilibrium institution) can be attributed to the differences in how presidentialism was originally designed by each constitution and what political effects and consequences it had brought (institutional equilibrium). It also demonstrates that only when both loser's consent and winner's restrain are guaranteed by constitutional design of citizens as the origin and anchor of a democratic regime, constitution can endure while otherwise it cannot. Because of such a difference, both the 1948 Constitution and the 1962 Constitution were later replaced by new ones respectively while the 1987 Constitution has remained unchanged for the last 23 years until today.