The Effects of Environmental Policies on Pollution Abatement Investments of Oligopolistic Firms under Uncertainty

本研究的目的是研究跨界污染与环境政策的随机微分博弈。排放的污染物将留在环境中，增加现有的污染存量。建立了由两个非对称政府共同参与求解的随机微分对策，得到了唯一的马尔可夫完美纳什均衡解和合作均衡解。随后，我们提出了一种机制来推导两国政府合作随机微分对策中子对策相容解的收益分配过程，并基于纳什协商公理导出了一个子对策相容解。

The purpose of this research is to investigate a stochastic differential game of transboundary pollution and environmental policy. Emitted pollutants will remain in the environment adding to the existing pollution stock. Each government controls its amount of pollutant.We formulate stochastic differential games, which need to be solved by two asymmetric governments involved, and derive unique Markov-perfect Nash and cooperative equilibrium solutions. Subsequently, we propose a mechanism for deriving the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in cooperative stochastic differential games of two governments, and a subgame consistent solution based on the Nash bargaining axioms is derived.