Rising Cross Shareholdings and Time-Series Properties of Accounting Information

本研究从几个方面考察了日本公司制特征的股权结构与会计信息之间的关系。处理这一问题的关键是了解表征市场价值代数函数的主要因素，并准确反映市场参与者的差异化偏好。在这一尝试中，得出了三个结论。首先，在非理性交易者存在的情况下，会计信息被系统性地扭曲了，因为管理者充分认识到市场价值在很大程度上反映了噪音交易者风险的影响。这些非理性的交易者可能包括公司和/或银行的股权，以加强业务关系的目的。其次，当市场价格相对于方差界检验所显示的特定水平存在时间异常方差时，需要谨慎使用剩余收益模型等估值公式。第三，也是最重要的，考虑了下游企业在双寡头市场竞争下的供应链最优披露政策。在这种情况下，下游企业的逆向所有权是至关重要的，因为上游企业最优地选择充分披露其投入价格。

This study investigated the relationship between the ownership structure featuring the Japanese corporate system and the accounting information in several aspects. The key to dealing with this issue is to understand the principal factors which characterize the algebraic function of the market value and which accurately reflect the differentiated preferences of market participants. In this attempt, three findings are derived. First, accounting information is systematically skewed in the presence of irrational traders because managers fully acknowledge the fact that the market value substantially reflects the effect of noise trader risk. These irrational traders may encompass corporate and/or bank equity ownership for the purpose of tightening business relationship. Second, the use of valuation formulae such as residual income model needs caveat when the market price is subject to a temporal abnormal variance relative to the specified level shown by the variance-bounds test. Third, and most importantly, the optimal disclosure policy of supply chain in which the downstream firms compete in a duopoly market is considered. In this setting the backward ownership of downstream firms is crucial in that upstream firms optimally choose full disclosure about their input prices.