Policy Determination under Non-democratic Regimes : A Game-theoretic Political Economy Approach

(1)我使用第二次世界大战后国际冲突的数据制作了一个新的（地缘）政治不稳定指数，并证明该指数与每个非民主国家的增长率有很强的正相关性。(2)本文构建了一个政治经济学模型，在这个模型中，政治精英们战略性地使用再分配政策来压制群众的抗议活动，证明了物质资本的回报率、遗赠动机的强度和人力资本禀赋的数量是决定非民主国家所采取的政策是促进增长还是抑制增长的关键因素。(3)本文通过一个税收优惠的政治经济学模型，论证了这种由政治任人唯亲所导致的歧视性政策会引起低效率要素流动的多米诺骨牌效应，从而产生预期驱动的多重均衡和经济不稳定。

(1) I make a new index of(geo) political instability using the data of international conflicts after World War II and demonstrate that the index has a strong positive correlation to the growth rate of each non-democratic country.(2) Constructing a political economy model in which political elite strategically use redistributive policy in order to suppress masses' protests, I demonstrate that the rate of returns on physical capital, the strength of bequest motive, and the amount of human capital endowment are critical factors that determine whether the adopted policies are growth-enhancing or growth-suppressing in non-democratic countries.(3) Using a political economy model of preferential taxation, I demonstrate that such a discriminatory policy induced by political cronyism causes a domino reaction of inefficient factor movements, which may generate expectation-driven multiple equilibria and economic instability.