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Policy Determination under Non-democratic Regimes : A Game-theoretic Political Economy Approach

非民主政权下的政策决定:博弈论政治经济学方法

基本信息

批准号：
21530268
负责人：
MURASE Hideaki
金额：
$ 2.5万
依托单位：
Nagoya City University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C)
财政年份：
2009
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2009 至 2011
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

(1) I make a new index of(geo) political instability using the data of international conflicts after World War II and demonstrate that the index has a strong positive correlation to the growth rate of each non-democratic country.(2) Constructing a political economy model in which political elite strategically use redistributive policy in order to suppress masses' protests, I demonstrate that the rate of returns on physical capital, the strength of bequest motive, and the amount of human capital endowment are critical factors that determine whether the adopted policies are growth-enhancing or growth-suppressing in non-democratic countries.(3) Using a political economy model of preferential taxation, I demonstrate that such a discriminatory policy induced by political cronyism causes a domino reaction of inefficient factor movements, which may generate expectation-driven multiple equilibria and economic instability.

（1）我利用二战后国际冲突的数据制作了一个新的（地缘）政治不稳定指数，并证明该指数与每个非民主国家的增长率具有很强的正相关性。（2）构建了一个政治经济模型，其中政治精英战略性地使用再分配政策来镇压群众的抗议，我证明了物质资本的回报率、遗赠动机的强度和人力资本的数量禀赋是决定非民主国家所采取的政策是促进增长还是抑制增长的关键因素。(3)利用税收优惠的政治经济学模型，我证明了这种由政治任人唯亲引发的歧视性政策会引起低效要素运动的多米诺骨牌反应，从而可能产生预期驱动的多重均衡和经济不稳定。