Empirical examinations on the relationship between the human capital investments and monitoring by shareholders in business corporations

本研究的目的是实证检验企业股东的人力资本投资与管理监督之间的权衡。基于大规模数据集的实证结果表明：(1)人力资本重要的企业利用盈余管理来减少纳税；(2)人力资本重要的企业平均将股息金额设定在较高水平，保留了相对大量的内部现金。此外，收购防御分析的实证结果表明，人力资本投资的动机可能存在管理壕沟。

The objective of this research is to examine empirically the tradeoff between the human capital investments and managerial monitoring by shareholders in business corporations. The empirical results based on the large-scale dataset show :(1) the firms in which human capital is important use earnings management in order to reduce tax payments and(2) the firms in which human capital is important on average set the amount of dividends at a relatively high level, preserving a relatively large amount of internal cash. In addition, the empirical results from the analysis of takeover defenses indicate that there may be managerial entrenchments in the motives of human capital investments.