An Empirical Study of The Effectiveness of Minority Shareholder Protection in Corporate Control Transactions in Japan

本研究实证分析了公司控制交易中股东间利益冲突可能较大的中小股东利益。由于与美国和欧盟相比，日本对中小股东的法律保护相对薄弱，因此本研究所分析的问题对于日本股权市场和公司控制市场的健康发展都具有重要意义。我的实证结果表明，日本很大一部分要约收购具有强制性。虽然新《公司法》及相关法律法规完善了对中小股东的保护，但仍有较大的改进空间。

This study empirically analyzes interests of minority shareholders under corporate control transactions in which conflicts of interests among shareholders are potentially large. Since, legal protections of minority shareholders are relatively weak in Japan compared to the US and the EU, the issues analyzed in this study are quite important for sound development of both equity market and market for corporate control in Japan. My empirical results reveals that large portion of tender offers in Japan have coercive nature. Although new Corporate Law and relevant laws and rules improve protection of minority shareholders, there is still large room for improvements.