Modeling of MAC Protocols Based on Incomplete Information Games and Countermeasures against Selfish Users

在随机接入网络中，节点通常按照指定的回退算法控制报文的传输。为了获得更多的带宽共享，一些节点可能会违背回退算法，表现得很自私。我们考虑这样一个场景：一个新节点准备加入一个开槽aloha型随机接入网络，并且必须在不知道网络中自私节点数量的情况下决定他应该诚实还是自私。数值结果表明，自私行为并不总是得到充分的回报，在某些情况下，自私行为提供的回报比诚实行为少。

In a random access network, a node generally controls its packet transmission according to the specified backoff algorithm. Some nodes may disobey the backoff algorithm and behave selfishly in order to obtain more bandwidth share. We consider a scenario where a new node is ready to join a slotted ALOHA-type random access network and has to decide whether he should behave honestly or selfishly without the knowledge of the number of selfish nodes in the network. Numerical results indicate that selfish behavior is not always amply rewarded and that it provides a selfish node with less payoff than honest behavior in some cases.