Game-Theoretic Studies on Information Networks and Distributed Systems

信息网络和分布式系统由许多独立的用户和组织共享，他们可能是独立/非合作的决策者。如果每个决策者通过非合作决策单方面地追求自己的性能目标，可以预期网络的整体性能将得到全面的改善。此外，人们预计，相互独立的决策，即非合作优化可能会带来的“公平”的情况下，所有的决策者可能会收到更坏的利益比其他一些方式的决策可能做的，如囚徒困境和Braess悖论。我们称之为公用事业悖论的退化。也就是说，不合作的决策可能是帕累托无效率的。在这项研究中，我们已经寻找的计划，可能是帕累托有效的，但可能会反映公平的非合作决策。

Information networks and distributed systems are shared by a number of independent users and organizations who may be independent/noncooperative decision makers. It may be expected that the entire performance of the networks will be guided to overall improvement, if each decision maker pursues its own performance objective unilaterally by means of the noncooperative decisions. In addition, it is anticipated that mutual independent decision making, i.e. noncooperative optimization may bring about the `fair' situations such that all decision makers may receive worse benefits than some other ways of decision making may do, as exemplified by the prisoners' dilemma and the Braess paradox. We call them such degradations of utilities 'paradoxes.' That is, the noncoopwerative decision making may be Pareto inefficient. In this study, we have searched the scheme that may be Pareto efficient but may reflect the fairness of the noncoopertive decision making.