Reconsidering the Post-war Consensus Thesis

本研究旨在为战后英国政治提供一种新的解读。人们通常将战后英国政治分为两个时期--一个基于战后共识，另一个以新自由主义共识为特征--撒切尔政府被视为从前者向后者转变的催化剂。我们的研究通过关注历届英国政府推行的对外经济政策，挑战了这一观点。我们发现，20世纪70年代的希思和卡拉汉政府追求的政策组合与战后和新自由主义共识截然不同。卡拉汉政府尤其试图减少英国历来的国际收支赤字，实现出口拉动型经济增长。加入新提出的欧洲货币体系被视为补充这一新经济战略的可取目标，尽管由于国内反对，英国政府无法将英镑纳入新计划。只有将撒切尔政府与这两届政府进行比较，我们才能理解它的新颖性。

The purpose of this research is to offer a new interpretation on postwar British politics. It is common to divide postwar British politics into two periods-one based on the postwar consensus and the other characterized by the neo-liberal consensus-with the Thatcher government regarded as a catalyst of the change from the former to the latter. Our research challenges this view by focusing on external economic policy pursued by the successive British governments. We find out that the Heath and Callaghan governments of the 1970s pursed a policy mix which is quite different from both the postwar and neo-liberal consensus. The Callaghan government in particular tried to reduce Britain's chronicle balance of payment deficit and achieve export-led economic growth. Participation in a newly proposed European monetary system was regarded as a desirable objective to complement this new economic strategy, though the government could not bring the pound into the new scheme due to domestic opposition. We will be able to understand the novelty of the Thatcher government only by comparing it with these two governments.