Theoretical and Empirical research on fiscal externalities and fiscal transfers in a hierarchical government structure

在等级制政府（如中央和地方）有共同税基的情况下，一个政府的税收政策通过税基的变化影响另一个政府的税收收入。当税基可以在地区之间移动时，在同一等级的政府之间也可以看到类似的证据。这些问题被称为财政外部性，被称为导致政府决策效率低下的因素。本文通过理论分析和实证分析探讨了财政外部性产生的机制，并提出了财政转移制度对外部性的抑制作用。

In a situation where hierarchical governments (e. g. the central and prefectures) have common tax base, a tax policy of the one government affects tax revenue of the other government via the change in tax base. Similar evidence can be seen between governments at the same hierarchy when a tax base can move between regions. These matters are called as fiscal externalities and known as the factors which cause governments to do inefficient decision-making. Our research investigated the mechanism of fiscal externalities by theoretical and empirical analyses and considered a fiscal transfer system to tame externalities.