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Equilibrium Coordination in the Implementation Problem: Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?

实施问题中的均衡协调：讲真话的均衡是否突出？

基本信息

批准号：
22730160
负责人：
MIZUKAMI Hideki
金额：
$ 2.33万
依托单位：
Aoyama Gakuin University
依托单位国家：
日本
项目类别：
Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B)
财政年份：
2010
资助国家：
日本
起止时间：
2010 至 2012
项目状态：
已结题

项目摘要

In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by definition. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria. So, it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows by economic experiments that in a direct revelation mechanism, if the mechanism which has multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium is salient among thoseequilibria. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium could become a focal point (Schelling (1960)).

在实施理论中，从理论的角度来看，所设计的机制是否具有多重均衡并不重要，因为这些均衡结果与定义上的社会目标是一致的。然而，当这些机制在实践中使用时，就会出现“均衡协调问题”，即代理如何决定在这些均衡中选择哪个均衡。最近流行的直接启示机制非常简单，可以实现多重平衡。因此，解决均衡协调问题是一个重要的问题。本研究通过经济学实验表明，在直接启示机制中，如果具有多个均衡的机制具有讲真话均衡，那么该均衡在多个均衡中是显著的。这意味着讲真话的均衡可以成为一个焦点（谢林（1960））。