Equilibrium Coordination in the Implementation Problem: Is the Truth-Telling Equilibrium Salient?

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In implementation theory, it does not matter from the theoretical viewpoint that the designed mechanism has multiple equilibria, since those equilibrium outcomes coincide with the social goal by definition. However, when those mechanisms are used in practice, the "equilibrium coordination problem" arises, i.e., how do agents decide which equilibrium to choose among those equilibria. Direct revelation mechanisms, which prevail recently, are simple enough to have multiple equilibria. So, it is an important problem to solve the equilibrium coordination problem. This study shows by economic experiments that in a direct revelation mechanism, if the mechanism which has multiple equilibria has the truth-telling equilibrium, the equilibrium is salient among thoseequilibria. This implies that the truth-telling equilibrium could become a focal point (Schelling (1960)).