Analysis of Dharmakirti's logic in the Pramanaviniscaya -- on the basis of Sanskrit manuscript of Dharmottara's commentary

为了理解Dharmakirti（c）逻辑的特征。本文首先概述了他在《认识方法论》中对狄那伽逻辑学的基本观点，并在其中对狄那伽逻辑学进行了新的阐释，然后重点阐述了法称体对命题定义的新阐释。此外，我根据梵文手抄本的达摩陀罗注释对这一定义进行了阐释，并将对法身逻辑的研究应用于佛教哲学的后期发展，在释迦牟尼（世纪）所著的《立场概要》（Stitisamasa）中阐述了两个瑜伽流派的立场和实践。此外，我澄清了主张认识有形式的瑜伽士和主张认识无形式的瑜伽士之间的理论差异。

In order to understand the characterisitc feature of the logic of Dharmakirti (c. 600-660), I first summarized his basic idea in logic in the Pramanaviniscaya (Determination of the means of cognition), in which he makes new interpretations of Dignaga's logic.In the present study, I focused on the elucidation of Dharmakirti's new interpretaions regarding the definition of thesis (paksa). Furthermore, I based the elucidation of this definition on the Sanskrit manuscript of Dharmottara's commentary.Applying the study of Dharmakirti's logic to later developments in Buddhist philosophy, I addressed the positions and practices of the two Yogacara school in the Sthitisamasa (Summary of positions) written by Sahajavajra (eleventh century). Furthermore, I clarified the theoretical differences between the Yogacaras who advovated the position that cognition has forms and the Yogacaras who advocated the position that cognition has no form.