A challenge; Evolutionary Game theory applying to dynamics of vehicle agents in traffic jam and its understanding of macroscopic phenomenon

在Yamuchi等人先前工作的基础上。(Pre 79)和Nakata等人。(Physica A 389)，他研究了封闭车道的交通流是否本能地包含社会困境，另一个问题是，在没有任何明显瓶颈的情况下，交通流中的车道变化是否会带来社会两难结构。模拟结果表明，具有高流量、高密度特征的流相具有明显的社会困境，所有驾驶员都倾向于采取尽可能长时间尝试换道的策略，从社会效益的角度来看，这是最不利的情况。然而，在局部拥堵但流量比整个拥堵阶段大得多的流态中，频繁的换道更能改善由平均流量定义的总社会回报，因为换道驾驶可以获得相当小的前进收益，导致比不换道驾驶更大的流量。

Following previous works by Yamauchi et al. (PRE 79) and Nakata et al. (Physica A 389), who investigated whether a traffic flow with lane closing instinctively contains social dilemma, another question of whether lane changes in a traffic flow without any evident bottlenecks bring about social dilemma structures. Simulation result reveals that flow phases featured with high flux and high density have obvious social dilemma classified with Prisoner’s Dilemma, where all drivers tend to take the strategy trying lane changes as long as possible, and this causes the worst beneficial situation from social benefit point of view. Whereas, in flow regimes having local jams but much more flux than entire jam phase, frequent lane changes can rather improve the total social payoff, defined by averaged flux, because driving with lane changes can earn pretty small forward gains, leading to larger flux than driving without any lane changes.