Transformation of the legislative powers under globalization

本研究以国际决策过程中的“议会保留”为研究对象。例如，希腊债务危机期间的超国家政权给了我们一个有趣的素材。如果这一制度迫使欧洲国家政府接受其他欧洲成员国的债务担保，那么政府有必要获得议会的个别同意吗？这类问题将在集体安全领域找到。我参考了德国法院的判决和条款，它们发展了让议会参与这些全球政策制定过程的理论。

This study focuses on the "Parliamentary Reservation" in international decision-making processes. For example, the supranational regime on the occasion of the Greek debt crisis gives us an interesting material. If that system obliges the national government to accept debt guarantees for other European member states, is it necessary for the government to obtain individual parliamentary consent? This type of problem will be found on the field of collective security. I have referred to the German court decisions and articles, which developed the theories about involving parliament in these processes of global policy-making.