Empirical research on Myopic Behavior in Japan

本研究回顾了以往有关近视行为的文献，并对近视行为进行了研究。首先，我发现管理层的预测是造成短视行为的原因之一。其次，我指出日本公司的任期比全球公司短。最后，我发现不提供管理层预测的公司倾向于报告净亏损，这些公司的增长低于提供管理层预测的公司。

This research reviews the previous literature on myopic behavior and investigates myopic behavior. First, I find that management forecasts are one of the causes of myopic behavior. Second, I show that the tenure of Japanese firms are shorter than that of global firms. Finally, I find that firms that do not provide management forecasts tend to report net loss and that those firms' growth are lower than the firms that provide management forecasts.