The Balance of Power: Analysis of Interstate Wars and Peaceful Resolutions of Conflict, 1000-2000 AD

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Publication of first paper on UN security council elections [Caro-Burnett and Weese 2023]. Follow-up work on political economy of international climate agreements now underway, also with Johann Caro Burnett (Hiroshima University).Joint research with David Schonholzer (Stockholm University) involved preparations for sabbatical visit to Stockholm University September 2023 - June 2024. Some progress on models of conflict: cooperative game coalition formation models appear to not be analytically tractable for wars involving more than two players. A search of the theoretical literature reveals very few theory papers analyzing a symmetric game of war with three or more players, and none of the small number of papers that do exist seems likely to lead to a reasonable estimation strategy.Non-cooperative form games may be more useful. In particular, with non-cooperative form games we can abandon the restriction that players must choose a "side" in the war, and that there must be exactly two sides. If we allow any player to fight any other player, then the model of war becomes a more standard network formation model, where any edge (i.e. war) is allowed to either exist or not exist in a given period.Reference:Caro-Burnett, J., & Weese, E. (2023). UN Security Council Elections as an Incentive for Compliance. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00220027231153575