Extending economic design to non-market settings: An experimental study of mechanism design with intention-based preferences

将经济设计扩展到非市场环境：基于意图偏好的机制设计实验研究

• 批准号: DE140101014
• 负责人: Prof Tom Wilkening
• 金额: $ 24.03万
• 依托单位: The University of Melbourne
• 依托单位国家: 澳大利亚
• 项目类别: Discovery Early Career Researcher Award
• 财政年份: 2014
• 资助国家: 澳大利亚
• 起止时间: 2014-06-30 至 2017-06-30
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://dataportal.arc.gov.au/RGS/Web/Grants/DE140101014
• 关键词: Extending; economic; design; non; market

Mechanism design is the engineering side of economic theory, which starts with assumptions regarding human nature and builds economic systems to best maximise efficiency according to these assumptions. This project studies mechanism design in experimental settings where individuals exhibit a desire to be kind to those who have been kind to them and unkind to those who have not. Such preferences are common in many non-market settings and can have dramatic effects on the efficiency of potential mechanisms. The ultimate goal of this project is to develop applied mechanisms that are robust to heterogeneity in such intention-based preferences and which can be used in bilateral exchange, contract design and many other non-market settings.

机制设计是经济理论的工程方面，它从人性的假设开始，并根据这些假设建立经济系统，以最大限度地提高效率。这个项目研究在实验环境中的机制设计，其中个人表现出对那些对他们友好的人友好，对那些没有友好的人不友好的愿望。这种优惠在许多非市场环境中很常见，可能对潜在机制的效率产生巨大影响。该项目的最终目标是开发适用于这种基于意图的偏好的异质性的机制，并可用于双边交换，合同设计和许多其他非市场环境。