Negotiating Justice: Responding to Corporate Wrongdoing in Brazil

简而言之，无效的实体法没有解决潜在的激励不对称问题，从而产生了打击士气的效果，这种不对称助长了有利于企业不法行为的环境。从机构的角度来看，低破案率--这是由于对咨询良好的公司立案的内在挑战--加上竞争性市场的冒险取向，是作为利润最大化的一种形式的企业不当行为的合理激励。更重要的是，从个人角度来看，由侦查产生的企业制裁传统上也没有导致最佳治安，因为它们不能有效地分配违法行为的负担。上市公司的管理人员，通常是少数股东，如果犯罪被发现，从犯罪中获得的个人利益比通过减少股息而损失的个人利益更多。因此，巨额罚款的责任不是落在肇事者身上，而是落在公司货物和服务的股东和消费者身上。因此，对公司施加制裁的威胁，而不是对个别违法者的制裁，威慑作用不足。(Ii)研究问题1。公司法人定义的缺陷如何阻碍对公司实体的有效起诉和判刑？2.在实体刑法的失败为违法行为造成固有的扭曲激励的情况下，如何将系统性公司不当行为概念化为预期的合理结果？3.协商司法制度是应对这种情况的最有效工具吗？4.《暂缓起诉协定》如何克服《宽大处理协定》的缺点，并打破发展中国家商业交易时断时续的次优均衡？鉴于协商司法在应对世界各地的公司不法行为方面发挥着越来越重要的作用，现有文献仍然有限，主要集中在发达国家的经验，这些国家的公司犯罪是准时的，而不是系统性的。此外，行为经济学最近的学术研究揭示了为什么宽大协议未能改变企业行为，也没有考虑替代政策。关于巴西的案例研究，这一研究项目将致力于促进这一令人遗憾的欠发达领域，其特点是国内和国际学术界的专业文献明显缺乏，尽管它对当今巴西的立法和经济政策制定产生了切实的影响。随着Lava Jato被告最近与美国、瑞士和一些南美和中美洲国家签署的宽大处理协议，该案件研究获得了国际参与和意义，并被美国司法部创造了“历史上最大的外国贿赂案件”。

In a nutshell, ineffective substantive laws have a demoralizing effect by failing to address the underlying incentive asymmetries that foster an environment conducive to corporate wrongdoing. From an institutional perspective, low detection rates-resulting from the intrinsic challenges of building cases against well-counseled corporations-coupled with competitive markets' risk-taking orientation represent rational incentives for corporate wrongdoing as a form of profit maximization. More importantly, from an individual perspective, the corporate sanctions that result from detection have also traditionally not resulted in optimal policing as they inefficiently distribute the burden of the offense. Managerial executives of publicly held firms, often minority shareholders, accrue more personal benefit from engaging in crime than lose through decreased dividends if the crime is detected. The burden of the substantial fine thus falls not on the perpetrators but on the shareholders and consumers of the corporations' goods and services. Therefore, the threat of sanctions imposed on the firm, as opposed to the individual wrongdoer, has an insufficient deterrent effect.(ii) Research Questions1. How do shortcomings in the definition of corporate personhood impede the effective prosecution and sentencing of corporate entities?2. How can systemic corporate wrongdoing be conceptualized as the expected rational outcome in settings where the failures of substantive criminal law create inbuilt distorted incentives for illegality?3. Is the institution of negotiated justice the most effective vehicle for responding to such scenarios?4. How can the Deferred Prosecution Agreement overcome the shortcomings of the Leniency Agreement and break the punctuated suboptimal equilibrium of business transactions in developing countries? In light of the increasingly important role played by negotiated justice in responding to corporate wrongdoing around the world, available literature is still limited and focuses greatly on the experiences of developed nations where corporate crime is punctual, rather than systematic. Moreover, recent scholarship in behavioral economics reveals why the Leniency Agreement fails to alter firm behavior but fails to consider alternative policies. Regarding the Brazilian casestudy, this research project will seek to contribute to a sadly underdeveloped field characterized by a marked paucity of specialized literature, both within domestic and international academic circles, despite its tangible repercussions in Brazilian legislative and economic policymaking today. With the recent Leniency Agreements signed by Lava Jato defendants with the United States, Switzerland and a number of South and Central American nations, the case study has gained international involvement and significance and coined "the largest foreign bribery case in history" by the U.S. Department of Justice.