Care Robots in Residential Homes for the Elderly: An ethical examination of deception, care and consent

我们正处在一场机器人革命的边缘：未来学家伊恩·皮尔森博士预测，到2050年，人们与栩栩如生的机器人发生性关系的人数将超过与其他人发生性关系的人数。在接下来的十年或二十年里，机器人将渗透到我们的工作场所、家庭和床上；这样一场革命的影响怎么估计都不为过。1859年，J.S.米尔提出了他的危害原则，指出国家干预公民行为的唯一原因是防止对他人的伤害。我的博士学位将是对密尔的伤害原则的批评，鉴于创造逼真的机器人所产生的一些尖锐的伦理问题。我将研究围绕模仿特定人的性机器人、老年人的性机器人、机器人保姆以及针对机器人的暴力的伦理问题。我将拒绝最近对危害的定义(斯图尔特2010，特纳2014)，并提出我自己的更广泛的定义，关于机器人在我们生活中的崛起，应该包括哪些危害。最重要的是，我认为密尔的伤害原则应该扩展到包括这四种情况下可能产生的心理伤害，我们必须记住，允许对机器人使用暴力可能会导致人类的伤害。这个项目建立在我的硕士论文的基础上，在论文中，我认为创造一个性爱机器人像一个特定的人是错误的，即使没有有害的后果，因为这样做相当于客观化(Nussbaum 1995，Gutiu 2012，Richardson 2016)。我在伦理、价值理论和政治哲学方面的硕士模块为我打算探索的社会、政治、法律和伦理雷区奠定了良好的基础，我将在总体上取得不同的成绩。我教A-Level哲学/社会学已经14年了，在此期间我一直是一名考官，出版了三本学术著作。这些丰富的经验培养了可移植的技能，如奉献精神、在最后期限前工作、研究以及熟悉哲学论点和概念。

We are on the brink of a robotic revolution: futurologist Dr Ian Pearson predicts that by 2050 people will have more sex with lifelike robots than with other people (Telegraph 29.9.15). Robots are set to infiltrate our workplaces, homes, and beds over the next decade or two; the impact of such a revolution cannot be overestimated.In 1859 J.S. Mill put forward his harm principle, stating that the only reason a State can intervene in the actions of citizens is to prevent harm to others. My PhD will be a critique of Mill's harm principle in light of some poignant ethical questions arising from the creation of lifelike robots.I will examine ethical questions surrounding sexbots made to resemble particular people, sexbots for the elderly, robot nannies, and violence against robots. I will reject recent definitions of harm (Stewart 2010, Turner 2014), and advance my own, broader definition of what harm should encompass with regard to the rise of robots in our lives. Crucially, I argue that Mill's harm principle should expand to include psychological harm which can arise from these four scenarios, and we must be mindful that permitting violence towards robots could lead to the harm of people.This project builds on my MA dissertation, in which I argue that it is wrong to create a sexbot to resemble a particular person, even if there are no harmful consequences, because doing so amounts to objectification (Nussbaum 1995, Gutiu 2012, Richardson 2016). My MA modules in Ethics, Value Theory and Political Philosophy provide an excellent grounding in the social, political, legal and ethical minefield I intend to explore, and I am set to achieve a Distinction overall. I've taught A-Level Philosophy / Sociology for 14 years, during which time I've been an examiner and published three academic works. This wealth of experience has developed transferable skills such as dedication, working to deadlines, research, and familiarity with philosophical arguments and concepts.