Essays on Microeconomic Theory

微观经济理论论文集

• 批准号: 2261852
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2261852
• 关键词: Essays; Microeconomic; Theory

The proposed research builds on my MPhil thesis, where I considered a setting that has received much attention in the literature: auditions in the performing arts. This is an interestingtest case because auditions require objectivity on part of the evaluator if applicants need to submit supplementary information in form of a CV, and performances are not blindfolded. In their seminalwork, Goldin and Rouse (2000) have shown that the move to blind auditions in the 1970s and 1980s fostered impartiality in hiring, and raised the proportion of women in major U.S. symphony orchestras.This work has led many to argue that blind auditions - a policy counteracting first impression biases - has promoted equal opportunity (Gladwell, 2005). But it is unclear how such policy influencesincentives: an unintended consequence of blind auditions may be an avalanche of auditionees. Thus, blind auditions come at the cost that evaluators loose supplementary information to screen applicantsby ability (Holland, 1981). If so, blind auditions do not necessarily have the claimed beneficial effects, such as the hiring of superior candidates (Gladwell, 2005). Understanding the conditions under whichblind auditions can be beneficial, thus, requires careful modelling. For my MPhil thesis I have developed a simple model to address questions such as: what are the repercussions of an evaluator's bias againsta specific group of applicants? In particular, when, and under which conditions, is it rational to ignore supplementary information, avoiding misleading first impressions? Can a move to blind auditions leadto more talented candidates being hired? How do effort incentives vary with the form of audition and severity of the bias? While the performing arts serve as motivating example, these questions are pertinentto a range of applications, including gender- and race-blind hiring, or grant applications in Academia.While my MPhil research provides a first insight into the trade-off of blind auditions, it does not addressfactors such as competition among applicants, the distinction between explicit and subconscious bias, orvolatility in performance quality. In future work, I therefore plan to extend my model in these directionsto discuss welfare implications and inform policy."

这项拟议的研究建立在我的MPhil论文的基础上，我在其中考虑了一个在文学领域受到很大关注的背景：表演艺术的海选。这是一个有趣的测试案例，因为如果申请者需要以简历的形式提交补充信息，而表演不是被蒙住眼睛的，那么海选要求评估者的部分客观。戈尔丁和劳斯(2000)在他们的半学术研究中表明，20世纪70年代和80年代的盲试促进了招聘的公正性，并提高了美国主要交响乐团中女性的比例。这项工作导致许多人认为，盲试--一项抵消第一印象偏见的政策--促进了机会平等(Gladwell，2005)。但目前还不清楚这种政策是如何影响激励措施的：盲目试镜的意外后果可能是海选者的雪崩。因此，盲目试听的代价是评估者根据能力来筛选申请者的补充信息(Holland，1981)。如果是这样的话，盲目试镜并不一定有所谓的好处，比如雇佣更优秀的候选人(Gladwell，2005)。因此，了解盲人试听的条件是有益的，需要仔细的建模。对于我的MPHIL论文，我开发了一个简单的模型来解决这样的问题：评估者对特定申请者群体的偏见会产生什么影响？特别是，在什么时候，在什么情况下，忽略补充信息，避免误导第一印象是合理的吗？盲目试镜的举措会导致更多有才华的应聘者被聘用吗？努力激励如何随着试听的形式和偏见的严重程度而变化？虽然表演艺术是一个激励人的例子，但这些问题与一系列申请有关，包括不考虑性别和种族的招聘，或者学术领域的拨款申请。尽管我的MPhil研究首次洞察了盲目试镜的权衡，但它没有解决申请者之间的竞争、显性和潜意识偏见之间的区别，或者表演质量的波动等因素。因此，在未来的工作中，我计划将我的模式扩展到这些方向，讨论福利影响并为政策提供信息。