Essays on Microeconomic Theory

拟议的研究建立在我的哲学硕士论文，在那里我考虑了一个设置，在文学中受到了很大的关注：在表演艺术的试镜。这是一个有趣的测试案例，因为如果申请人需要以简历的形式提交补充信息，试镜要求评估者客观，并且表演不是盲目的。戈尔丁和劳斯（Goldin and Rouse，2000）的研究表明，20世纪70年代和80年代的盲试促进了招聘的公正性，提高了美国主要交响乐团中女性的比例，这一研究使许多人认为盲试--一种抵消第一印象偏见的政策--促进了机会平等（Gladwell，2005）。但目前还不清楚这些政策是如何影响激励机制的：盲选的一个意想不到的后果可能是试镜者的雪崩。因此，盲审的代价是评估者失去了根据能力筛选申请者的补充信息（Holland，1981）。如果是这样的话，盲试并不一定有声称的有益效果，如雇用上级候选人（Gladwell，2005）。因此，要理解盲审的有利条件，需要仔细的建模。对于我的硕士论文，我已经开发了一个简单的模型来解决这样的问题：什么是评价者的偏见对特定群体的申请人的影响？特别是，在什么时候和什么条件下，忽略补充信息，避免误导性的第一印象是合理的？盲选能让更多有才华的候选人被录用吗？努力激励如何随着试听形式和偏见的严重程度而变化？虽然表演艺术是一个激励性的例子，但这些问题与一系列应用有关，包括性别和种族盲招聘，或学术界的拨款申请。虽然我的哲学硕士研究首次揭示了盲面试的利弊，但它并没有解决诸如申请人之间的竞争，显性和潜意识偏见之间的区别，或表演质量的波动性等因素。因此，在未来的工作中，我计划在这些方向上扩展我的模型，以讨论福利影响并为政策提供信息。"

The proposed research builds on my MPhil thesis, where I considered a setting that has received much attention in the literature: auditions in the performing arts. This is an interestingtest case because auditions require objectivity on part of the evaluator if applicants need to submit supplementary information in form of a CV, and performances are not blindfolded. In their seminalwork, Goldin and Rouse (2000) have shown that the move to blind auditions in the 1970s and 1980s fostered impartiality in hiring, and raised the proportion of women in major U.S. symphony orchestras.This work has led many to argue that blind auditions - a policy counteracting first impression biases - has promoted equal opportunity (Gladwell, 2005). But it is unclear how such policy influencesincentives: an unintended consequence of blind auditions may be an avalanche of auditionees. Thus, blind auditions come at the cost that evaluators loose supplementary information to screen applicantsby ability (Holland, 1981). If so, blind auditions do not necessarily have the claimed beneficial effects, such as the hiring of superior candidates (Gladwell, 2005). Understanding the conditions under whichblind auditions can be beneficial, thus, requires careful modelling. For my MPhil thesis I have developed a simple model to address questions such as: what are the repercussions of an evaluator's bias againsta specific group of applicants? In particular, when, and under which conditions, is it rational to ignore supplementary information, avoiding misleading first impressions? Can a move to blind auditions leadto more talented candidates being hired? How do effort incentives vary with the form of audition and severity of the bias? While the performing arts serve as motivating example, these questions are pertinentto a range of applications, including gender- and race-blind hiring, or grant applications in Academia.While my MPhil research provides a first insight into the trade-off of blind auditions, it does not addressfactors such as competition among applicants, the distinction between explicit and subconscious bias, orvolatility in performance quality. In future work, I therefore plan to extend my model in these directionsto discuss welfare implications and inform policy."