Nietzsche on Honesty

在研究语境上，尼采的自由观是尼采学派的一个中心问题，主要有三个解释问题。首先，尼采拒绝自由意志和非自由意志，这意味着传统的哲学标签--如“决定论”或“内/兼容论”--并不容易适用。其次，尽管尼采拒绝自由意志，但他通过这些著作积极地利用了这一概念，但并不清楚为什么或在什么意义上。第三，尼采要求我们“放逐”意志的概念，但他也暗示，我们无法通过自我反省来改变自己的任何东西。因此，目前还不清楚自由意志将如何或何种意义上被“放逐”。这些都是我将在我的研究中解决的问题。我的研究问题对应于文献中的三个空白。首先，哪些活动会带来自由？我将对这个问题提供一个原创性的回答，认为对尼采来说，自由可以被自由意志的积极幻觉所激发。这一论点只在第二部文献中被粗略地讨论过。其次，是什么原因导致了这些活动？在这里，我的目标是解决这样一个问题：如果我们不能通过自我反省来改变自己的任何方面，我们如何才能将自由意志的概念从我们的头脑中“驱逐”出去。这个问题在文献中已经提出来了，但仍然没有得到解决。第三，我们要从什么中解脱？在这里，我将论证尼采的自由意味着从其他人中解放出来，它与Oshana(2008)的关系自治理论有相似之处。回答这三个问题将有助于回答我的中心研究问题。我的研究的潜在影响有三个。首先，我将介绍当代尼采学术中的几场关键辩论，特别是莱特、吉姆斯和里卡迪的辩论，因为尼采的自由概念支撑着他的许多核心思想。其次，我将尼采与当代自由文学进行对话，这是我对研究原创性的主要要求。此外，将尼采与奥沙纳的关系自治理论联系起来，这是当代社会学和女权主义自由文学发展的核心，使我的研究具有更广泛的跨学科相关性。第三，自由影响我们所有人；我将提出一种观念，在拒绝自由意志的情况下，它可以说是更真实的，因此对我们的生活更有意义。因此，我的研究可以造福于许多人的生活，在这方面，有很大的潜力产生广泛的文化影响。

Regarding research context, Nietzsche's conception of freedom is a central problem in Nietzschescholarship due to three interpretive issues. Firstly, Nietzsche rejects both free will and unfree will, whichmeans that traditional philosophical labels - such as "determinism" or "in/compatibilism" - are not easilyapplicable. Secondly, despite rejecting free will, Nietzsche makes positive use of the concept throughouthis writings, and it is not clear why or in what sense. Thirdly, Nietzsche asks us to "banish" the concept offree will from our minds, yet he also implies that we are incapable of changing anything about ourselvesthrough self-reflection. It is therefore unclear how or what sense free will is to be "banished". These arethe problems which I shall address in my research.My research questions correspond to three gaps in the literature. Firstly, which activities cause freedom? Iwill provide an original response to this question, arguing that, for Nietzsche, freedom can be motivatedby the positive illusion of free will. This argument has been only cursorily addressed in the secondaryliterature. Secondly, what causes these activities? Here, I aim to resolve the problem of how we can"banish" the concept of free will from our minds if we are incapable of changing anything aboutourselves through self-reflection. This problem has been raised in the literature but remains unresolved.Thirdly, what are we to become free from? Here, I will argue that Nietzschean freedom means freedomfrom other people and that it shares similarities with Oshana's (2008) theory of relational autonomy.Answering these three questions will help to answer my central research question.The potential impact of my research is threefold. Firstly, I will inform several key debates incontemporary Nietzsche scholarship, especially debates framed by Leiter, Gemes, and Riccardi, becauseNietzsche's conception of freedom underpins many of his central ideas. Secondly, I will bring Nietzscheinto conversation with the contemporary literature on freedom, which is my main claim to researchoriginality. Additionally, relating Nietzsche to Oshana's theory of relational autonomy, which has beencentral to contemporary developments in the sociological and feminist literature on freedom, gives myresearch broader interdisciplinary relevance. Thirdly, freedom affects us all; and I will advance aconception which, in rejecting free will, is arguably truer and hence more meaningful to our lives. Myresearch could therefore benefit the lives of many, in which respect there is great potential for widesocio-cultural impact.