Nietzsche on Honesty

尼采论诚实

• 批准号: 2270993
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Warwick
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2019
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2019 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2270993
• 关键词: Nietzsche; Honesty

Regarding research context, Nietzsche's conception of freedom is a central problem in Nietzschescholarship due to three interpretive issues. Firstly, Nietzsche rejects both free will and unfree will, whichmeans that traditional philosophical labels - such as "determinism" or "in/compatibilism" - are not easilyapplicable. Secondly, despite rejecting free will, Nietzsche makes positive use of the concept throughouthis writings, and it is not clear why or in what sense. Thirdly, Nietzsche asks us to "banish" the concept offree will from our minds, yet he also implies that we are incapable of changing anything about ourselvesthrough self-reflection. It is therefore unclear how or what sense free will is to be "banished". These arethe problems which I shall address in my research.My research questions correspond to three gaps in the literature. Firstly, which activities cause freedom? Iwill provide an original response to this question, arguing that, for Nietzsche, freedom can be motivatedby the positive illusion of free will. This argument has been only cursorily addressed in the secondaryliterature. Secondly, what causes these activities? Here, I aim to resolve the problem of how we can"banish" the concept of free will from our minds if we are incapable of changing anything aboutourselves through self-reflection. This problem has been raised in the literature but remains unresolved.Thirdly, what are we to become free from? Here, I will argue that Nietzschean freedom means freedomfrom other people and that it shares similarities with Oshana's (2008) theory of relational autonomy.Answering these three questions will help to answer my central research question.The potential impact of my research is threefold. Firstly, I will inform several key debates incontemporary Nietzsche scholarship, especially debates framed by Leiter, Gemes, and Riccardi, becauseNietzsche's conception of freedom underpins many of his central ideas. Secondly, I will bring Nietzscheinto conversation with the contemporary literature on freedom, which is my main claim to researchoriginality. Additionally, relating Nietzsche to Oshana's theory of relational autonomy, which has beencentral to contemporary developments in the sociological and feminist literature on freedom, gives myresearch broader interdisciplinary relevance. Thirdly, freedom affects us all; and I will advance aconception which, in rejecting free will, is arguably truer and hence more meaningful to our lives. Myresearch could therefore benefit the lives of many, in which respect there is great potential for widesocio-cultural impact.

就研究语境而言，尼采的自由概念是尼采研究的中心问题，原因在于三个解释问题。首先，尼采拒绝自由意志和非自由意志，这意味着传统的哲学标签——如“决定论”或“内在/相容”——不容易适用。其次，尽管拒绝自由意志，尼采在整个作品中积极地使用了这个概念，但不清楚为什么或在什么意义上。第三，尼采要求我们从我们的头脑中“驱逐”自由意志的概念，但他也暗示我们无法通过自我反思来改变自己。因此，不清楚自由意志将如何或在何种意义上被“放逐”。这些都是我在研究中要解决的问题。我的研究问题对应于文献中的三个空白。首先，哪些活动能带来自由？对于这个问题，我将提供一个原创的回答，认为对尼采来说，自由可以被自由意志的积极幻觉所激发。这一论点在二手文献中只是粗略地提到过。其次，是什么导致了这些活动？在这里，我的目标是解决这个问题：如果我们无法通过自我反思来改变自己，我们如何才能从我们的头脑中“驱逐”自由意志的概念。这个问题已在文献中提出，但仍未解决。第三，我们要摆脱什么？在这里，我将论证尼采的自由意味着脱离他人的自由，它与奥沙纳（2008）的关系自治理论有相似之处。回答这三个问题将有助于回答我的中心研究问题。我的研究的潜在影响是三重的。首先，我将介绍当代尼采学术研究中的几个关键争论，尤其是由莱特、格梅斯和里卡尔第构成的争论，因为尼采的自由概念支撑了他的许多核心思想。其次，我将把尼采与当代自由文学进行对话，这是我对研究独创性的主要主张。此外，将尼采与奥沙纳的关系自主理论联系起来，这对当代社会学和女权主义自由文学的发展至关重要，使我的研究具有更广泛的跨学科相关性。第三，自由影响我们所有人；我将提出一个概念，在拒绝自由意志的情况下，它可以说是更真实的，因此对我们的生活更有意义。因此，我的研究可以使许多人的生活受益，在这方面，它有可能产生广泛的社会文化影响。