Al-Taftazani As The Quintessential Philosophical Theologian: Contextualising The Post-Mongol Transoxanian Islamic Theological Tradition

毫无疑问，公元656/1258年巴格达的陷落戏剧性地改变了伊斯兰世界。更新的学术研究记录了蒙古人统治下的伊斯兰世界前所未有的政治变化将如何促使许多重大的社会文化、教育和智力发展。鉴于对后蒙古族历史的这些重新概念化的态度，人们不再可能接受这样的说法，即“理性主义哲学”被边缘化，转而支持“正统神学”，这随后导致了伊斯兰世界一个知识衰退的时代，蒙古帝国的征服进一步加剧了这一时代。然而，很明显，作为这些叙述的结果，后蒙古族伊斯兰哲学神学及其主要代表、文本和趋势仍然研究不足，被忽视，或尚未被发现。这就是帖木儿时代的神学家Sa‘d al-Din al-Taftazani(草792/1390)的思想。考虑到这些对后蒙古族历史的较新的历史态度，这个项目开辟了一条新的探究路线，即塔夫塔扎尼对现实本质的理解。这篇论文的核心是对神学家关于现实本质的主要问题的审查，即：谁是‘上帝’或什么是‘上帝’？这样的问题引起了哲学(法萨法)和系统神学(卡拉姆)的代表们的关注，他们的互动和融合将协调并作为塔夫塔扎尼自己的方法的基础和智力基础。这一双重基础对于理解塔夫塔扎尼和他的企业至关重要。一方面，作为一名神学家，塔夫塔扎尼将坚持他的教义承诺，即上帝是世界的最终原因，并创造其他存在，作为人类知识的对象。另一方面，塔夫塔扎尼将依赖伊本·西纳(d.428/1037)的形而上学框架中提供的方法论工具和词汇，其核心在于本质--事物是什么--与它们的存在--这些事物如何存在--之间的概念区别。值得注意的是，神学动机促使塔夫塔扎尼努力澄清存在的本质：对塔夫塔扎尼来说，理解上帝、他的本质和他的存在依赖于对现实本质的系统阐述。因此，为了考察塔夫塔扎尼对上帝的理解，本项目将考虑塔夫塔扎尼的整体形而上学计划。首先，它将考察塔夫塔扎尼的一般本体论，他对存在本质的系统处理，并阐述塔夫塔扎尼为什么和如何在卡拉姆的背景下使用阿维森南图式。这也将包括塔夫塔扎尼对与塔夫塔扎尼的神学事业相关的本体论问题的处理，例如存在是否是一个可以同时适用于上帝和所有其他现存事物的单一概念。其次，它将考虑塔夫塔扎尼如何处理从这个一般本体论中产生的主要认识论问题，例如存在是否不言而喻，以及它对存在于头脑中的事物意味着什么。这种对塔夫塔扎尼一般本体论的考察将有助于澄清上帝与世界之间的概念联系--前者是必要的、永恒的和单一的，而后者是可能的、暂时起源的和复数的--然后再考察塔夫塔扎尼对上帝本质问题的处理方法。这种对塔夫塔扎尼形而上学的考察也将促使塔夫塔扎尼根据蒙古统治引起和促进的重大地缘政治、社会文化和教育变化以及他的知识遗产，来解释是什么具体因素、来源和影响塑造了塔夫塔扎尼和他的事业，这是非常必要的。

That the Fall of Baghdad in 656/1258 dramatically changed the Islamic world is unquestionable. Newer scholarship has documented how the unprecedented political shifts in the Islamic world under the Mongols would prompt a number of significant socio-cultural, educational, and intellectual developments. In light of these reconceptualised attitudes to post-Mongol history, it is no longer possible to accept the narrative that 'rationalist philosophy' was marginalised in favour of 'theological orthodoxy' which subsequently prompted an era of intellectual decline in the Islamic world, further exacerbated by the Mongol Conquests. However, it is clear that as a consequence of these narratives, post-Mongol Islamic philosophical theology and its major representatives, texts, and trends remain understudied, neglected, or yet to be discovered. Such is true of the thought of the Timurid-era theologian Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani (d. 792/1390). With these newer historical attitudes to post-Mongol history in mind, this project opens up a new line of enquiry, namely Taftazani's understanding of the nature of reality.At the heart of this thesis is an examination of a theologian's primary question concerning the nature of reality, namely: who or what is 'God'? Such a question preoccupied representatives of both philosophy (falsafa) and systematic theology (kalam), whose interactions and convergences would harmonise and serve as the foundation and intellectual basis for Taftazani's own approach. This twofold foundation is crucial in understanding Taftazani and his enterprise. On the one hand, as a theologian, Taftazani would uphold his doctrinal commitment that God is the ultimate cause of the world and creates other existents that would serve as the objects of knowledge for humans. On the other hand, Taftazani would rely on the methodological tools and lexis offered in the metaphysical framework of Ibn Sina (d. 428/1037), at the heart of which rests the conceptual distinction between essences-what things are-and their existence-how these things exists. What is crucial to note is that a theological motivation propels Taftazani's endeavour to clarify the nature of existence: for Taftazani, understanding God, His nature, and His existence relies on a systematic exposition of the nature of reality in general.As such, in order to examine Taftazani's understanding of God, this project will consider Taftazani's overall metaphysical project. First, it will examine Taftazani's general ontology, his systematic treatment concerning the nature of existence, and address why and how Taftazani uses the Avicennan schema within the context of kalam. This will also include Taftazani's treatments of ontological questions pertinent to Taftazani's theological enterprise, such as whether existence is a single concept that can be applied to both God and all other existing things. Secondly, it will consider how Taftazani tackles the major epistemological problems that arise from this general ontology, such as whether existence is self-evident and what it means for things to exist in the mind. This examination of Taftazani's general ontology will then serve to clarify the conceptual links between God and the world-the former necessary, eternal, and singular and the latter possible, temporally originated, and plural-before examining Taftazani's approach to the question of God's nature. This examination of Taftazani's metaphysics will also prompt a much-needed contextualisation of Taftazani in light of the major geopolitical, socio-cultural, and educational changes caused and facilitated by Mongol rule, and his intellectual heritage in order to explain what specific factors, sources, and influences shaped Taftazani and his enterprise.