'Evaluate the impact of the Jewish insurgency between 1945 & 1948 in effecting the British Governments decision to withdraw from Mandate Palestine.'

“评估 1945 年间犹太叛乱的影响

• 批准号: 2438822
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Oxford
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2438822
• 关键词: Evaluate; impact; Jewish; insurgency; between

In early 1947, Ernest Bevin, British Foreign secretary, informed the Defence Committee that staying in Palestine was of great importance if ample oil were to continue to flow to Britain. The Chiefs of Staff agreed, concluding that 'handing over the Mandate [would lead to a loss of] our predominant position in the Middle East.' Yet, on the 20th September 1947, the British cabinet voted to withdraw from Palestine. Why? Writing on the reasons for the British evacuation of Palestine, the respected Mandate historian, Motti Golani declares that 'the question of "who expelled the British from Palestine" has long since ceased to engage historians of the late British Mandate period.' In Golani's reading (shared by many other historians of the Mandate) the Jewish insurgency played very little role in ending British rule in Palestine. Instead, the historiography treats the end of the Mandate as symptomatic of a rapid & irreversible collapse of the British Empire, brought about by Britain's weak economic position after 1945. Add to this American pressure, the Labour party's ostensible will to decolonise & a desire by both Labour & the populace to focus on domestic issues & the traditional argument is complete. My research at BA & MA level has led me to the conclusion that the conventional historiography does not accurately portray the impact of the insurgency & therefore needs revaluating. The historiography tends to focus on physical destruction caused by the insurgency, dismissing this cost as a drop in the water in terms of Britain's post-war problems. However, my work would cast a wider net. Section of my thesis would deal with the impact of the insurgency on the morale of the British in Palestine (army personnel, police, civil servants & administrators), the public reaction to events in Palestine as well as what impact the declining morale of the British in Palestine & public outrage & hysteria had on those with power & influence: the government, parliament, civil servants & the top echelons of the administration in Palestine, such as the last High Commissioner. It will also be necessary to devote space to studying the economic situation of Britain post-war & the overall financial impact of the insurgency. By 1947, Britain was spending £30 million per annum on the police & £40 million on military upkeep in Palestine. By considering social, political & economic points of view my research will avoid becoming merely 'political history', 'bottom up history', instead offering a holistic view of the insurgency.The various facets of my research requires the use of primary source material available in the UK & in Israel. With regards to the morale of the army & police force, the Middle East Centre Archive at St Anthony's College is indispensable. Interviews carried out with ex-members of the police & army in Palestine offer a first-hand insight into the period by those who experienced the insurgency at close quarters. For the more difficult task of ascertaining the attitude of the British public to events in Palestine, I believe the Mass Observation surveys, held at Sussex University, are of particular use. The organization gathered data from a diverse range of people from varying classes, cities & of political views, giving a more comprehensive picture of what 'the people' thought. Also of use are letters columns in newspapers & diaries from the period. Both contain expressions of frustration & anger over the insurgency. Political & economic documents also need to be examined. All of these resources, taken together as a single body, are invaluable for challenging the existing historiography by authors working in both English & Hebrew. Regarding Hebrew sources, the Menachem Begin Heritage Centre, the Central Zionist Archives, the National Library of Israel & the Jabotinsky Institute all hold useful primary materials which deal with the insurgent's tactics, aims and contact between the various groups

1947年初，英国外交大臣欧内斯特•贝文（Ernest Bevin）告知国防委员会，如果要让充足的石油继续流入英国，留在巴勒斯坦是非常重要的。参谋长们对此表示同意，并得出结论：“移交托管权（将导致）我们丧失在中东的主导地位。”然而，1947年9月20日，英国内阁投票决定从巴勒斯坦撤军。为什么?受人尊敬的托管历史学家Motti Golani在撰写英国撤离巴勒斯坦的原因时宣称，“是谁将英国人驱逐出巴勒斯坦的问题”早已不再是英国托管后期历史学家的话题了。在戈兰尼的解读中（其他许多研究托管的历史学家也有同感），犹太人的叛乱在结束英国对巴勒斯坦的统治方面发挥了很小的作用。相反，史学将托管的结束视为大英帝国迅速而不可逆转的崩溃的征兆，这是1945年后英国经济地位薄弱造成的。加上美国的压力，工党表面上的非殖民化意愿，工党和民众都希望关注国内问题，传统的论点已经完成。我在学士和硕士阶段的研究让我得出这样的结论：传统的史学并没有准确地描述叛乱的影响，因此需要重新评估。历史编纂倾向于关注叛乱造成的物质破坏，对英国战后问题而言，这只是沧海一粟。然而，我的工作将撒下更大的网。部分我的论文将处理叛乱的影响英国在巴勒斯坦的士气(军队人员、警察、公务员和管理员),公众对事件的反应在巴勒斯坦以及影响士气下降的英国在巴勒斯坦歇斯底里和公众的愤怒和对那些拥有权力和影响力:政府、议会、公务员和政府的高层领导的巴勒斯坦,如最后一个高级专员。它也将有必要投入空间来研究英国战后的经济状况&叛乱的整体金融影响。到1947年，英国每年花费3000万英镑用于警察和4000万英镑用于在巴勒斯坦的军事维持。通过考虑社会、政治和经济的观点，我的研究将避免仅仅成为“政治史”、“自下而上的历史”，而是提供对叛乱的整体看法。我的研究的各个方面需要使用在英国和以色列可用的主要来源材料。关于军队和警察部队的士气，圣安东尼学院的中东中心档案馆是不可或缺的。对巴勒斯坦前警察和军队成员的采访为那些近距离经历叛乱的人提供了对这一时期的第一手见解。对于确定英国公众对巴勒斯坦事件的态度这一更困难的任务，我相信在苏塞克斯大学举行的群众观察调查特别有用。该组织收集了来自不同阶层、城市和政治观点的各种各样的人的数据，从而更全面地了解了“人民”的想法。这一时期报纸上的信件、专栏和日记也很有用。两者都表达了对叛乱的沮丧和愤怒。政治和经济文件也需要审查。所有这些资源，作为一个单一的机构，是无价的挑战现有的历史编纂作者在英语和希伯来语工作。关于希伯来文资料，Menachem Begin遗产中心、中央犹太复国主义档案馆、以色列国家图书馆和Jabotinsky研究所都持有有用的原始资料，这些资料涉及叛乱分子的策略、目标和各团体之间的联系