The astropolitics of cyber attacks against global navigation satellite systems

针对全球导航卫星系统的网络攻击的天体政治

• 批准号: 2440432
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Bath
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2020
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2020 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2440432
• 关键词: astropolitics; cyber; attacks; against; global

Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS), such as the Global Positioning System, provide positioning, navigation and timing services which underpin critical national infrastructure (CNI). Despite their criticality, they have limited built in security and back ups, making them a target for disruptive cyber attacks. Up until now, international regulations and agreements have maintained cooperation and peace in space, through shared global infrastructure and norms. However, independence of nation state infrastructure is growing, for instance through national and regional navigation systems, like China's BeiDou. This makes GNSS attacks more likely, as nation states become more competitive and less reliant on each other's infrastructure.This research builds upon existing astropolitical theory and attack analysis to create an cyber attack taxonomy used to anticipate strategy, tactics, techniques and procedures of future nation state GNSS attacks and how they achieve astropolitical goals.

全球导航卫星系统（GNSS），如全球定位系统，提供定位、导航和定时服务，是国家关键基础设施（CNI）的基础。尽管它们至关重要，但它们的内置安全性和备份有限，使它们成为破坏性网络攻击的目标。到目前为止，国际法规和协议通过共享全球基础设施和规范，维持了空间的合作与和平。然而，民族国家基础设施的独立性正在增长，例如通过国家和区域导航系统，如中国的北斗。这使得全球导航卫星系统的攻击更有可能，因为民族国家变得更具竞争力，减少对彼此的基础设施的依赖。这项研究建立在现有的天文政治理论和攻击分析，以创建一个网络攻击分类，用于预测战略，战术，技术和未来民族国家的全球导航卫星系统的攻击程序，以及他们如何实现天文政治目标。