Universal properties of compositional structure in language

语言具有层次结构;它的最小组成部分--语音，或者是符号语言中的信号的时间片段（Brentari，2002）-孤立地是没有意义的，但它们联合收割机创造了像单词这样的有意义的单位，单词进一步联合收割机创造了短语，然后是句子，等等。在英美和西欧语言学中，我们被训练将这种结构分为形态，单词的内部结构和句法，短语的内部结构（例如，关键的是，这种划分取决于对“词”有一个明确的定义;否则，我们就不知道在词内结构和词间结构之间的界限在哪里。但是，尽管几十年来的工作旨在制定普遍的诊断词，没有一个定义的“词”是有效的所有世界上的语言（参见。狄克逊和Aikhenvald，2003年; Haspelmath，2011年; Pike，1952年; Tallman，2020年; Zwicky和Pullum，1983年）。因此，现在是从一个新的角度来处理这个老问题的时候了。我认为，可能没有办法定义“词”，从而区分形态和句法，因为形态和句法可能不是语言的独立子系统，而是一个单一的组成系统的两个层次。这个想法得到了对简单性的基本认知偏好的支持（Chater和Vitányi，2003）：为什么要有两个组成系统，而一个就可以了？此外，对语言进化的研究表明，语言由于竞争压力而进化其组成结构，以使其既可学习又可表达（Kirby et al.，2014; Kirby等人，2015），而且这些区分单词和句子的压力并没有原则上的理由。基于这个想法，我的项目将采取一种全新的方法来解决词的问题。我将开创性地使用最初为发展心理学和语言进化而创建的实验方法，沿着贝叶斯认知模型，来问：有什么证据证明语言成分水平之间的认知差异？为了回答这个问题，我将研究语言共性及其认知基础。共性是在许多（不相关的）语言中重复出现的特征。它们通常被假设为由认知原则来解释，因为人类认知决定了语言可以采取的形式（Berent et al.，2008; Chomsky，1988;卡伯特森等人，2012; Fedzechkina等人，2012; Ferdinand等人，2019;哈德逊卡姆和纽波特，2005;柯比等人，2015; Wilson，2006）。我将检验语言共性是否以同样的方式在词法和句法中表现出来。如果是这样的话，这可能是因为两个层次都有一个单一的成分系统。我的发现对理论语言学具有重要意义，因为它们将为该领域长期存在的核心问题提供新的证据。

Language has hierarchical compositional structure; its smallest components-speech sounds, or temporal slices of signals in signed language (Brentari, 2002)-are meaningless in isolation, but they combine to create meaningful units like words, which further combine to create phrases, then sentences, and so on. In Anglo-American and Western European linguistics, we are trained to divide this structure into morphology, the internal structure of words, and syntax, the internal structure of phrases (e.g., Aronoff and Rees-Miller, 2003).Crucially, this division depends on having a solid definition of "word"; otherwise, we cannot know where to draw the line between intra-word and inter-word structure. But despite decades of work aiming to formulate universal diagnostics of wordhood, no definition of "word" is valid for all the world's languages (cf. Dixon and Aikhenvald, 2003; Haspelmath, 2011; Pike, 1952; Tallman, 2020; Zwicky and Pullum, 1983). It is therefore time to approach this old question from a new angle. I propose that there might be no way to define "word", and thus to distinguish morphology and syntax, because morphology and syntax might not be separate subsystems of language, but rather two levels of a singular compositional system. This idea is supported by the fundamental cognitive preference for simplicity (Chater and Vitányi, 2003): why have two compositional systems when one would do? Further, research on language evolution has shown that language evolves its compositional structure due to competing pressures for it to be both learnable and expressive (Kirby et al., 2014; Kirby et al., 2015), and there is no principled reason for these pressures to distinguish words from sentences.Based on this idea, my project will take an entirely novel approach to the issue of wordhood. I will pioneer the use of experimental methods originally created for developmental psychology and language evolution, along with Bayesian cognitive modelling, to ask: what evidence is there for a cognitive distinction between levels of composition in language?To answer this, I will investigate language universals and their cognitive basis. Universals are features that recur across many (unrelated) languages. They are often hypothesized to be explained by cognitive principles, since human cognition determines the form that language can take (Berent et al., 2008; Chomsky, 1988; Culbertson et al., 2012; Fedzechkina et al., 2012; Ferdinand et al., 2019; Hudson Kam and Newport, 2005; Kirby et al., 2015; Wilson, 2006). I will test whether language universals manifest the same way in morphology and syntax. If they do, this may be because a single compositional system underlies both levels. My findings will be significant for theoretical linguistics, since they will provide new evidence for a long-standing core issue in the field.