Delusions: Exploring Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Vigilance

妄想：探索认知不公正和认知警惕

• 批准号: 2573262
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Birmingham
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2573262
• 关键词: Delusions; Exploring; Epistemic; Injustice; Vigilance

In everyday social transactions, we typically grant that others have some knowledge, and the skill to speak sincerely and reasonably about what they know. Granting this is important to ensure their fair treatment in a variety of situations. Epistemic injustice occurs when this is missing (Fricker, 2007). When we do not grant that someone has knowledge or the ability to communicate it for prejudicial reasons, the speaker experiences a credibility deficit; we view them as less credible than they are. My project will focus on epistemic injustice specifically as it arises in the clinical and everyday treatment of people who have delusions. I will explore two questions:1. Why are people who have delusions vulnerable to epistemic injustice? Here I will explore the notion of epistemic vigilance, which is the sense of being on our guard when evaluating testimony. I will apply this notion to the context of delusional cognition and argue that we are overly vigilant against believing false information issuing from subjects with delusions. I will also consider the negative stereotypes which are associated with delusions (e.g. clinical irrationality), and how these deflate epistemic credibility.2. How can we resolve the conflict between epistemic vigilance and epistemic injustice in cases of delusional cognition? I will argue that dispelling the stereotypes identified in the first question, increasing clinical awareness of epistemic injustice, and a focus on patient-centred care will reduce the vulnerability of those with delusions to epistemic injustice.

在日常的社会交往中，我们通常会承认别人有一些知识，并且有能力真诚而合理地谈论他们所知道的。给予这一点对于确保他们在各种情况下得到公平对待是很重要的。当这一点缺失时，认知不公正就会发生（Fricker, 2007）。当我们出于偏见的原因而不承认某人有知识或有能力交流时，说话者就会经历信誉缺失；我们认为他们不那么可信。我的项目将专注于认识上的不公正，特别是在临床和日常治疗中出现的错觉患者。我将探讨两个问题：1。为什么有错觉的人容易受到认知不公正的影响？在这里，我将探讨认知警惕性的概念，这是我们在评估证词时保持警惕的感觉。我将把这个概念应用到妄想认知的背景下，并认为我们过于警惕，不相信来自妄想主体的虚假信息。我还将考虑与妄想（例如临床非理性）相关的负面刻板印象，以及这些刻板印象如何降低认知可信度。在妄想认知的情况下，我们如何解决认知警惕性和认知不公正之间的冲突？我认为，消除在第一个问题中确定的刻板印象，提高临床对认识不公正的认识，并关注以患者为中心的护理，将减少那些有错觉的人对认识不公正的脆弱性。