Addressing Non-State Actor Proliferation of Chemical Weapons in a Rapidly Changing Global Security Context: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Independe

在快速变化的全球安全背景下解决非国家行为者化学武器扩散问题：独立化学武器的跨学科分析

• 批准号: 2573366
• 金额: --
• 依托单位: University of Nottingham
• 依托单位国家: 英国
• 项目类别: Studentship
• 财政年份: 2021
• 资助国家: 英国
• 起止时间: 2021 至 无数据
• 项目状态: 未结题
• 来源: https://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=studentship-2573366
• 关键词: Addressing; Non; State; Actor; Proliferation

The international community has recently borne witness to an unprecedented nexus, of overwhelming support and innumerable contraventions, of the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. A stark observation has been the reported use and manufacture of traditional chemical weapons by non-state actors, once considered highly improbable. The defined scope of actors and contextual security risks of those involved in the use and proliferation of chemical weapons has expanded beyond what was envisioned when the Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intended to tackle the expanding scope of non-state actors under Resolution 1540. However, notwithstanding state efforts to implement both legal and enforcement measures, the non-proliferation regime continues to falter a step behind emerging risks. The identifiable gaps within the legal framework are paralleled by the political reality and restrictions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), prompting the question of how the international community can act effectively to address the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors. This thesis will examine the normative and institutional framework that governs the chemical non-proliferation regime, specific to non-state actors. The limitations of existing legal instruments will be explored in view of the new challenges posed by emerging technological and scientific advancements. Providing a clear exposition of the non-proliferation regime governing chemical weapons will also require an examination of the institutions and initiatives that tackle proliferation outside the international legal order. This is central to my thesis, as I seek to substantiate the proposition that the ongoing issues of adaptability to new risks seen within the core regime are suitably overcome by initiatives and organisations that exist outside this system. I will explore comparatively, the role, efforts, and cooperation of multiple stakeholders when tackling scientific and technological advancements. This will be supported by an original qualitative data set, collated from elite interviews of several key actors, ranging from those within the top-line core organisations, to the private industry bodies at the forefront of scientific and technological advancements. This will also be assisted by empirical qualitative data sourced from communications between organisations such as those provided during the OPCW Conference of the States Parties. The data gathered will be used to support an exposition of best practices that can adapt to the rapidly changing global security context that subsumes non-state actors.Essential to my thesis will be the inclusion of an interdisciplinary approach that combines legal doctrinal analysis alongside theoretical lenses seated in international relations. Pursuant to this approach, is the contextual examination of how in practice and policy can a multi-stakeholder forum contribute and function effectively to support the non-proliferation regime. A wide range of policy and practical non-proliferation efforts will be highlighted from 'soft and hard' legal instruments to industry codes of conduct, exploring whether they reinforce the regime. I will seek to substantiate the proposition that divergence from normative expectations within international law towards a greater focus on informal instruments has the potential to become best practice and policy when tackling, with pace, emerging proliferation risks.

国际社会最近目睹了反对使用化学武器的国际准则空前的联系，压倒性的支持和无数的违反。一个严峻的观察是，据报道，非国家行为者使用和制造传统化学武器，这一度被认为是极不可能的。参与使用和扩散化学武器的行为者的界定范围和相关安全风险已经超出了通过《化学武器公约》时的设想。联合国安理会（UNSC）打算根据第1540号决议解决非国家行为体范围扩大的问题。然而，尽管各国努力执行法律和执法措施，不扩散制度仍然落后于新出现的风险。与法律框架中可识别的漏洞并行的是政治现实和禁止化学武器组织（禁化武组织）的限制，这引发了一个问题，即国际社会如何能够有效地采取行动，解决非国家行为者扩散化学武器的问题。本文将研究管理化学不扩散制度的规范和制度框架，具体到非国家行为体。鉴于新出现的技术和科学进步所带来的新挑战，将探讨现有法律文书的局限性。要明确说明管理化学武器的不扩散制度，还需要审查在国际法律秩序之外处理扩散问题的机构和倡议。这是我论文的核心，因为我试图证实这样一个命题，即在核心制度内看到的对新风险的适应性问题，正在被存在于该制度之外的倡议和组织适当地克服。我将比较探讨在应对科技进步的过程中，多方利益相关者的作用、努力和合作。这将得到一个原始的定性数据集的支持，这些数据集是从几个关键参与者的精英访谈中整理出来的，从顶级核心组织的精英到处于科技进步前沿的私营行业机构。这也将得到来自组织间通信的经验定性数据的协助，例如在禁化武组织缔约国会议期间提供的数据。收集的数据将用于支持最佳实践的阐述，以适应包括非国家行为者在内的快速变化的全球安全环境。对我的论文至关重要的是包含一种跨学科的方法，将法律理论分析与国际关系中的理论镜头结合起来。根据这一方针，对多利益攸关方论坛如何在实践和政策上为支持不扩散制度作出贡献和有效发挥作用进行背景审查。广泛的政策和实际的防扩散努力将被强调，从“软硬”法律文书到行业行为准则，探讨它们是否会加强这一制度。我将设法证实这样一种主张，即背离国际法的规范性期望，更加注重非正式文书，有可能成为逐步解决新出现的扩散风险的最佳做法和政策。