Addressing Non-State Actor Proliferation of Chemical Weapons in a Rapidly Changing Global Security Context: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of Independe

国际社会最近目睹了反对使用化学武器的国际规范空前的联系，既有压倒性的支持，也有无数的违反。一个严峻的观察是，据报道，非国家行为者使用和制造传统化学武器，这一度被认为是极不可能的。参与使用和扩散化学武器的行为者的界定范围和相关安全风险已经超出了《化学武器公约》通过时的设想。联合国安全理事会打算根据第1540号决议解决非国家行为者范围扩大的问题。然而，尽管各国努力执行法律的和执法措施，但不扩散制度仍然落后于新出现的风险。法律的框架内存在的明显差距被政治现实和禁止化学武器组织的限制所掩盖，这就提出了国际社会如何有效采取行动解决非国家行为者扩散化学武器问题的问题。本论文将探讨规范和体制框架，管理化学不扩散制度，具体到非国家行为者。鉴于新出现的科技进步带来的新挑战，将探讨现有法律的文书的局限性。要明确阐述化学武器不扩散制度，还需要审查在国际法律的秩序之外处理扩散问题的机构和举措。这是我的论文的核心，因为我试图证实的命题，即核心制度内看到的新风险的适应性的持续问题，适当克服的倡议和组织，存在于这个系统之外。我将比较探讨在应对科学和技术进步时多个利益相关者的作用、努力和合作。这将得到一个原始的定性数据集的支持，这些数据集是从对几个关键参与者的精英访谈中整理出来的，从顶级核心组织内部的人员到处于科技进步前沿的私营行业机构。这也将得到来自各组织之间交流的经验性定性数据的帮助，例如在禁止化学武器组织缔约国大会期间提供的数据。收集到的数据将被用来支持最佳实践，可以适应快速变化的全球安全环境，包括非国家actors.Essential我的论文将是一个跨学科的方法，结合法律的理论分析与理论镜头坐在国际关系的阐述。根据这一办法，应结合具体情况审查多方利益攸关方论坛如何在实践和政策上为支持不扩散制度作出贡献和有效运作。会议将着重讨论从“软的和硬的”法律的文书到工业行为守则等一系列广泛的政策和实际不扩散努力，探讨它们是否能加强该制度。我将努力证实这样一种主张，即偏离国际法中的规范性期望，更多地注重非正式文书，有可能成为在逐步处理新出现的扩散风险时的最佳做法和政策。

The international community has recently borne witness to an unprecedented nexus, of overwhelming support and innumerable contraventions, of the international norm against the use of chemical weapons. A stark observation has been the reported use and manufacture of traditional chemical weapons by non-state actors, once considered highly improbable. The defined scope of actors and contextual security risks of those involved in the use and proliferation of chemical weapons has expanded beyond what was envisioned when the Chemical Weapons Convention was adopted. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) intended to tackle the expanding scope of non-state actors under Resolution 1540. However, notwithstanding state efforts to implement both legal and enforcement measures, the non-proliferation regime continues to falter a step behind emerging risks. The identifiable gaps within the legal framework are paralleled by the political reality and restrictions of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), prompting the question of how the international community can act effectively to address the proliferation of chemical weapons by non-state actors. This thesis will examine the normative and institutional framework that governs the chemical non-proliferation regime, specific to non-state actors. The limitations of existing legal instruments will be explored in view of the new challenges posed by emerging technological and scientific advancements. Providing a clear exposition of the non-proliferation regime governing chemical weapons will also require an examination of the institutions and initiatives that tackle proliferation outside the international legal order. This is central to my thesis, as I seek to substantiate the proposition that the ongoing issues of adaptability to new risks seen within the core regime are suitably overcome by initiatives and organisations that exist outside this system. I will explore comparatively, the role, efforts, and cooperation of multiple stakeholders when tackling scientific and technological advancements. This will be supported by an original qualitative data set, collated from elite interviews of several key actors, ranging from those within the top-line core organisations, to the private industry bodies at the forefront of scientific and technological advancements. This will also be assisted by empirical qualitative data sourced from communications between organisations such as those provided during the OPCW Conference of the States Parties. The data gathered will be used to support an exposition of best practices that can adapt to the rapidly changing global security context that subsumes non-state actors.Essential to my thesis will be the inclusion of an interdisciplinary approach that combines legal doctrinal analysis alongside theoretical lenses seated in international relations. Pursuant to this approach, is the contextual examination of how in practice and policy can a multi-stakeholder forum contribute and function effectively to support the non-proliferation regime. A wide range of policy and practical non-proliferation efforts will be highlighted from 'soft and hard' legal instruments to industry codes of conduct, exploring whether they reinforce the regime. I will seek to substantiate the proposition that divergence from normative expectations within international law towards a greater focus on informal instruments has the potential to become best practice and policy when tackling, with pace, emerging proliferation risks.