Samuel Beckett, Ludwig Wittgenstein and the I

在阅读维特根斯坦的《逻辑哲学论》时，贝克特指出：“形而上学的主体不属于世界，而是世界的边界。”维特根斯坦扩展说，“我面对每一个对象，但不是我”，预示着贝克特的，“在你的一生中，你能对自己说我吗？”贝克特学术界很少承认维特根斯坦的I。然而，这种联系对传记、哲学和遗传学方法有着至关重要的影响。它始于这样一个命题，即我是“我们语言中最具误导性的表征技巧”之一，因为维特根斯坦--贝克特的《无名氏》中的“鲱鱼”--煽动人们寻找一个缺席的指称。对两者来说，这都导致了消除“我”的必要性;不可避免地，维特根斯坦认为，“我们会看到先前的表述对事实并不重要”，这一想法支撑了贝克特的《不是我和公司》。这些相似之处仍然没有被阐明。除了纯粹的相似之处，这个项目将展示贝克特后期对维特根斯坦的兴趣如何与他所有作品中I的描述的转变相吻合。这将解释维特根斯坦的重要性，同时质疑这种后期发展如何挑战/发展他早期的，更好地了解，哲学的影响。最后，探讨贝克特如何成为维特根斯坦的重要批评家之一。

Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Beckett marked: 'The metaphysical subject doesnot belong to the world but is a boundary of it'. Wittgenstein expanded, 'I confront every object but notthe I', prefiguring Beckett's, 'Could you ever say I to yourself in your lifetime?'Beckett scholarship has seldom acknowledged Wittgenstein's I. The connection, however, has crucialimplications for biographical, philosophical, and genetic approaches. It begins with the proposition thatthe I is among 'the most misleading representational techniques in our language', for Wittgenstein - 'toored a herring' for Beckett's Unnamable - instigating a search for an absent referent. It leads, for both, tothe necessity of the I's elimination; inevitably, Wittgenstein argued, 'we'd see the previousrepresentation wasn't essential to the facts', the idea underpinning Beckett's Not I and Company. Theseparallels remain unelucidated.Beyond mere affinities, this project will demonstrate how Beckett's late interest in Wittgenstein coincideswith a shift in the I's depiction across his oeuvre. This will situate Wittgenstein's significance whilequestioning how this late development challenges/develops his earlier, better known, philosophicalinfluences. Finally, it explores how Beckett becomes one of Wittgenstein's important critics.