Attribution of Cyber Incidents in International Diplomacy using Zero Knowledge Proofs

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State-sponsored cyber operations benefit from a lack of a suitable attribution mechanism in international diplomacy. Whilst the inability to definitively point to a state actor undermines the deterrent objective of many states' cyber strategies, the cost of misattribution is great - potentially leading to unnecessary conflict escalation. Further complication arises where such judgements involve intelligence derived from clandestine sources, which victim states may be hesitant to divulge. As such, given limitations on the use of kinetic force in international law, cyberspace has become increasingly weaponised in hostile state action. The focus of this project is therefore to consider technical approaches to the difficulties of cyber attribution in international diplomacy. Zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) are mathematical constructs which allow information to be verified between parties - a prover and a verifier - without being divulged. This feature, which has seen their application in contexts requiring high confidentiality and integrity (such as distributed ledger technology and blockchain), makes them an attractive area for research in this regard. Thus, the currently proposed direction is to investigate the suitability of ZKPs in the context of information-sharing in international diplomacy; in particular, attributing acts of cyber malfeasance to state actors.