Prospects for a Ramseyan Pragmatism

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I will address two central questions. Firstly, a question of significance for history of philosophy: what was the origin and nature of Frank Ramsey's pragmatism? Secondly, a question of philosophical significance: how does this Ramseyan pragmatism fare as a philosophical position?On the historical question, I already reject Cheryl Misak's now influential interpretation of Ramsey, presented in Cambridge Pragmatism (2016). His was not entirely a pragmatism in the vein of C. S. Peirce: rather, Ramsey was emphatic that Peirce's view governs only 'secondary systems' (1990a, 161). Ramseyan pragmatism is therefore a local pragmatism that rests on a distinction between primary and secondary systems. In the DPhil, I will examine this crucial distinction in depth; starting with Theories (1990b), wherein Ramsey exemplifies the distinction, and continuing to an earlier draft thereof (FPRP 005-17-01), and the scientific work from which the talk of 'systems' originated (Campbell 1920), and Wittgenstein's contemporaneous work on das erste / zweite System.I will also clarify Ramsey's place in the history of ideas. I will show that Ramsey's pragmatism resulted from a three-way marriage between the insights of Bertrand Russell's 1920s pragmatism, Peirce's pragmatism, and a minimalist realism to which Ramsey had subscribed since his teenage years, which he reprised in the unfinished book draft, On Truth (1991). As for Ramsey's legacy, I will examine arguments purporting that Ramsey's views exerted influence on Wittgenstein, and consider not only the relationship between Ramsey's ideas and Wittgenstein's mature philosophy, but also recent arguments (e.g. Boncompagni 2017) that Ramsey specifically pushed Wittgenstein into his middle phase(s) (c.1929-1944).Turning to the philosophical front: I will compare Ramseyan pragmatism with other pragmatist offerings to demonstrate that it is not only distinctive but compelling. Unlike global pragmatisms (Price 2013, Brandom 1994), Ramseyan pragmatism can resist realist arguments from 'creeping minimalism' (Dreier 2004, Williams 2013); and unlike quasi-realism (Blackburn 1998) and other local pragmatisms, the 'localising' primary-secondary distinction resists 'instability' arguments. I will thus defend Ramseyan pragmatism from the 'instability' arguments levelled specifically at it by Holton and Price (2003), and from those aimed generally at local pragmatisms by Price elsewhere (1996, 2015, Macarthur and Price 2007).My principal research method will be to study a large volume of primary and secondary literature. To ensure my knowledge of Ramsey's work and life is exhaustive, the primary literature will include the entire body of writing-personal and professional, published and unpublished-produced by Ramsey. Some of these materials reside in the Frank Plumpton Ramsey archive at the University of Pittsburgh (which is available digitally); some biographical materials are held by the King's College Cambridge archive. The primary literature will also include Ramsey's contemporaries and associates: principally Russell and Wittgenstein, but also Charles Ogden, Max Newman and Richard Braithwaite. This reading (including potential manuscript material) will ensure that I can confidently reconstruct the intellectual context for Ramsey's work. The secondary literature will consist mostly of the literature on pragmatism and anti-representationalism, against which potential philosophical merits (or demerits) of Ramsey's work must be assessed. I will study and engage as much as possible of the work of historical and contemporary pragmatists (e.g. the American pragmatists, Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, Ruth Millikan, Robert Brandom, Hilary Putnam, Huw Price) to address those questions about local and global pragmatism. Secondary literature will also include the literature on post-Tractatus Wittgenstein, and work from figures in the pragmatist philosophy of science (e.g. Philip Kitcher, Hasok Chang).