The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Reevaluating Cognitive Behavioural Therapy as treatment for Phobias

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The context of my PhD is philosophical debate about the boundary between perception and cognition (Stokes 2021). This is a highly contested issue, anchored in the philosophy of perception, but where different areas of philosophy cross paths, and where philosophy meets cognitive science. Building on my undergraduate and MA dissertations, in Part 1 I aim to set out a new perspective on the foundational issues, and in Part 2 I apply this beyond the traditional scope of philosophy of perception, developing a new understanding of phobias.I will structure my PhD in terms of three key questions. Part 1 begins with the foundational question of how we are to distinguish perception and cognition. I will argue there is a border between perception and cognition, but a porous one. I aim to show that the passivity of perception, and activity in cognition, reveal that perception and cognition, though distinct, function simultaneously, in constant correspondence. I will explore the influence of cognition on attention, and, in turn, the influence of attention on perception, taking as a case study inattentional blindness (Simon & Chabris, 2010).In supposing a porous border between perception and cognition, I assume that perception is cognitively penetrable, which leads naturally to my second question: is this assumption defensible? I aim to argue that it is, by focusing on implicit bias as a case study. Developing Siegel's (2017) work on the rationality of perception, I argue that implicit racial biases can cognitively penetrate our visual experiences, causing us to irrationally discriminate against minority groups in perception itself. In Part 2, I turn to my third question of whether this framework can be applied beyond the typical confines of philosophy of perception. I argue that it can, specifically in enhancing current understanding of phobias.My starting point will be an exploration of cognitive emotions (Nussbaum, 2004). I will argue that we can understand these as cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences, thereby explaining three notable characteristics: their immediacy; immunity to rational judgement; and their powerful influences on behaviour. I will take phobias as a case study of cognitive emotions, where therapy both succeeds and fails. This enables me to investigate why phobias are sometimes resistant to rational intervention and other times responsive. I aim to explain this in terms of differential influences of cognitive penetration on phobic perceptual experiences.My methods are threefold. First, employing the traditional methods of philosophical inquiry: conceptual analysis; phenomenological description; and theory building. Second, undertaking cross-disciplinary engagement by exploring cognitive scientific models of perception, and third drawing on empirical psychology (clinical and otherwise) to inform my discussion of phobias.This work will be impactful in philosophy and beyond: contributing new ideas to the traditional debate about the perception/cognition border, but also supplying grounds for the development of cognitive behavioural therapy as treatment for phobias. If the overall framework of my PhD is correct, then we should expect cognitive therapeutic interventions to apply not only to judgements and behaviour, but to perceptual experiences themselves.