The Cognitive Penetrability of Perception: Reevaluating Cognitive Behavioural Therapy as treatment for Phobias

我的博士学位的背景是关于感知和认知之间界限的哲学辩论（Stokes 2021）。这是一个备受争议的问题，它植根于感知哲学，但哲学的不同领域交叉了道路，哲学与认知科学相遇了。在我的本科和硕士学位论文的基础上，在第一部分中，我的目标是对基础问题提出一个新的视角，在第二部分中，我将其应用于传统的感知哲学范围之外，对恐惧症进行新的理解。我将用三个关键问题来构建我的博士学位。第一部分从我们如何区分知觉和认知的基本问题开始。我认为感知和认知之间是有界限的，但这个界限很模糊。我的目的是表明，感知的被动性和认知的主动性，揭示了感知和认知虽然不同，但同时起作用，保持一致。我将探讨认知对注意力的影响，反过来，注意力对感知的影响，作为一个案例研究无意失明（Simon & Chabris, 2010）。在假设知觉和认知之间有一个多孔的边界时，我假设知觉是认知上可以穿透的，这自然导致了我的第二个问题：这个假设站得住吗？我的目标是通过将内隐偏见作为案例研究来证明这一点。在西格尔（2017）关于感知合理性的研究基础上，我认为内隐的种族偏见可以在认知上渗透到我们的视觉体验中，导致我们在感知本身上非理性地歧视少数群体。在第二部分中，我转向我的第三个问题，即这个框架是否可以应用于知觉哲学的典型范围之外。我认为它可以，特别是在增强当前对恐惧症的理解方面。我的出发点将是对认知情绪的探索（Nussbaum, 2004）。我认为我们可以将这些理解为认知渗透的感知体验，从而解释三个显著特征：它们的即时性；免于理性判断；以及它们对行为的强大影响。我将把恐惧症作为认知情绪的一个研究案例，在这个案例中，治疗既有成功的，也有失败的。这使我能够研究为什么恐惧症有时会抵制理性干预，有时则会做出反应。我的目的是用认知渗透对恐惧知觉体验的不同影响来解释这一点。我的方法有三种。首先，采用传统的哲学探究方法：概念分析；现象学的描述;建立理论。第二，通过探索感知的认知科学模型进行跨学科的参与，第三，借鉴经验心理学（临床和其他方面）来为我对恐惧症的讨论提供信息。这项工作将在哲学和其他领域产生影响：为关于感知/认知边界的传统辩论提供新思路，同时也为认知行为疗法作为恐惧症治疗的发展提供依据。如果我博士的总体框架是正确的，那么我们应该期待认知治疗干预不仅适用于判断和行为，而且适用于感知体验本身。

The context of my PhD is philosophical debate about the boundary between perception and cognition (Stokes 2021). This is a highly contested issue, anchored in the philosophy of perception, but where different areas of philosophy cross paths, and where philosophy meets cognitive science. Building on my undergraduate and MA dissertations, in Part 1 I aim to set out a new perspective on the foundational issues, and in Part 2 I apply this beyond the traditional scope of philosophy of perception, developing a new understanding of phobias.I will structure my PhD in terms of three key questions. Part 1 begins with the foundational question of how we are to distinguish perception and cognition. I will argue there is a border between perception and cognition, but a porous one. I aim to show that the passivity of perception, and activity in cognition, reveal that perception and cognition, though distinct, function simultaneously, in constant correspondence. I will explore the influence of cognition on attention, and, in turn, the influence of attention on perception, taking as a case study inattentional blindness (Simon & Chabris, 2010).In supposing a porous border between perception and cognition, I assume that perception is cognitively penetrable, which leads naturally to my second question: is this assumption defensible? I aim to argue that it is, by focusing on implicit bias as a case study. Developing Siegel's (2017) work on the rationality of perception, I argue that implicit racial biases can cognitively penetrate our visual experiences, causing us to irrationally discriminate against minority groups in perception itself. In Part 2, I turn to my third question of whether this framework can be applied beyond the typical confines of philosophy of perception. I argue that it can, specifically in enhancing current understanding of phobias.My starting point will be an exploration of cognitive emotions (Nussbaum, 2004). I will argue that we can understand these as cognitively penetrated perceptual experiences, thereby explaining three notable characteristics: their immediacy; immunity to rational judgement; and their powerful influences on behaviour. I will take phobias as a case study of cognitive emotions, where therapy both succeeds and fails. This enables me to investigate why phobias are sometimes resistant to rational intervention and other times responsive. I aim to explain this in terms of differential influences of cognitive penetration on phobic perceptual experiences.My methods are threefold. First, employing the traditional methods of philosophical inquiry: conceptual analysis; phenomenological description; and theory building. Second, undertaking cross-disciplinary engagement by exploring cognitive scientific models of perception, and third drawing on empirical psychology (clinical and otherwise) to inform my discussion of phobias.This work will be impactful in philosophy and beyond: contributing new ideas to the traditional debate about the perception/cognition border, but also supplying grounds for the development of cognitive behavioural therapy as treatment for phobias. If the overall framework of my PhD is correct, then we should expect cognitive therapeutic interventions to apply not only to judgements and behaviour, but to perceptual experiences themselves.