Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory

动态进化博弈论

• 批准号: 7822-2013
• 负责人: Cressman, Ross
• 金额: $ 1.09万
• 依托单位: Wilfrid Laurier University
• 依托单位国家: 加拿大
• 项目类别: Discovery Grants Program - Individual
• 财政年份: 2015
• 资助国家: 加拿大
• 起止时间: 2015-01-01 至 2016-12-31
• 项目状态: 已结题
• 来源: https://www.nserc-crsng.gc.ca/ase-oro/Details-Detailles_eng.asp?id=568542
• 关键词: Dynamic; Evolutionary; Game; Theory

The overall objective of my research program is to develop the theory of evolutionary games and its applications to biology and economics. The basic static concept of the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) has played a key role in the mathematical modeling of individual behaviour in conflict situations by also predicting the eventual behavioral distribution of standard single-species frequency-dependent evolutionary processes such as the replicator dynamics. Less well-understood are the dynamic consequences of the ESS concept (and its generalizations) for ecological systems when there are many species and/or population sizes evolve. The proposed research program will examine these consequences for predator-prey interactions and for more general coevolutionary models in ecology. I have recently shown that behavioral (i.e. frequency) effects and ecological (i.e. population size) effects decouple when analyzing the spatial distribution of a single-species among different habitats, providing a thorough understanding of these "habitat-selection" games. The proposed game-theoretic approach has the potential to provide a similar understanding of the much more complex biological systems involving more than one species. Predator foraging behaviour is of fundamental importance when modeling predator-prey systems. The proposed research seeks to predict sequential predator foraging decisions through the theory of extensive form games, a natural setting to model such ongoing interactions. This is a novel research direction and is an important initial stage connecting extensive form games to biology. The other objective is to investigate the evolution of cooperation in theoretical models and in corresponding game experiments, topics of much current interest for many prominent research groups. Explanations based on evolutionary game theory have typically assumed that players' payoffs depend only on their strategies and not on other factors such as their status. The proposal will incorporate asymmetries such as those between young and old, owner and non-owner of a resource into the model. Theoretical results will be compared to those from human game experiments to better understand mechanisms that generate cooperative behaviour.

我的研究计划的总体目标是发展进化博弈理论及其在生物学和经济学中的应用。进化稳定策略(ESS)的基本静态概念通过预测复制因子动态等标准单一物种频率依赖进化过程的最终行为分布，在冲突局势中的个人行为数学建模中发挥了关键作用。不太清楚的是，当有许多物种和/或种群规模进化时，ESS概念(及其概括)对生态系统的动态影响。 拟议的研究计划将检验捕食者-猎物相互作用的这些后果，以及生态学中更一般的共同进化模型。我最近证明，在分析单一物种在不同生境中的空间分布时，行为(即频率)效应和生态(即种群规模)效应是脱钩的，从而提供了对这些“栖息地选择”游戏的透彻理解。拟议的博弈论方法有可能为涉及不止一个物种的更复杂的生物系统提供类似的理解。在建立捕食者-食饵系统模型时，捕食者的觅食行为是非常重要的。这项拟议的研究试图通过广泛形式博弈的理论来预测顺序捕食者的觅食决定，这是对这种正在进行的相互作用进行建模的自然环境。这是一个新的研究方向，也是将广泛的形式游戏与生物学联系起来的一个重要的初始阶段。 另一个目标是在理论模型和相应的博弈实验中调查合作的演变，这些都是许多著名研究小组当前非常感兴趣的话题。基于进化博弈论的解释通常假设玩家的收益只取决于他们的策略，而不是他们的地位等其他因素。该提案将把年轻人和老年人之间、资源所有者和非所有者之间的不对称纳入模型。理论结果将与人类游戏实验的结果进行比较，以更好地理解产生合作行为的机制。