Comprehensive Security Assurance Solutions for Software-Dependent Systems

面对网络攻击和故障，人们越来越需要确保依赖于软件的关键系统及其使用、存储和通信的信息的安全。随着系统变得更大、更复杂，它们更容易受到各种不可预见的安全漏洞的影响。因此，在其发展的所有阶段都应考虑安全问题。目前对我们建立的系统进行安全“固定”的方法是不够的。相反，我们需要考虑这些系统日益苛刻的安全需求，并将其设计为具有安全特性，这样就可以生成足够的证据来支持安全保证声明，并对正在开发的系统进行推理。*本研究计划的总体目标是通过增强工程安全软件依赖系统的按设计安全的方法来建立全面的安全保证解决方案。更具体地说，它的目标是开发更多增量、模块化和组合式的解决方案，从一开始就确保系统的安全，并生成充分的证据，证明它们对一系列网络攻击和故障具有内置的弹性。这需要将正式的(数学上严格的)方法和按设计确定的安全方法相结合，以提供可验证的证据来支持系统开发早期阶段的安全保证声明。我们将通过以下方式实现这一目标：(1)开发正式的建模和分析框架，以便在开发的早期阶段为依赖软件的系统的安全特性提供保证的数学证明；(2)建立系统级的安全评估方法和技术，以了解和减轻已识别的安全漏洞对系统资产构成的风险；以及(3)先进的技术，以支持管理、评估和提供足够的证据来开发增量安全保证案例。*政府、企业和用户希望得到保证，他们使用的网络系统提供足够的保护，以减少他们遇到攻击或故障时的潜在风险和相关损失。预期的结果将有助于在系统开发的所有阶段建立充分的证据来提供这一保证。这将有助于减轻对依赖软件的大型复杂系统的安全性进行推理的一些挑战，以及与安全保证和认证相关的高昂成本。这项研究支持加拿大的战略投资，将自己定位为网络安全领域的全球领导者。所获得的结果有可能影响和影响与高保证安全软件依赖系统的开发、评估和认证实践有关的标准、法规和指南的制定，使加拿大人能够对支撑他们日常生活的网络系统有更高的信心。

There is an ever-growing need to assure the security of critical software-dependent systems, and the information that they use, store, and communicate, in the face of cyber-attacks and failures. As systems grow larger and more complex they become more susceptible to a variety of unforeseen security vulnerabilities. Security should therefore be considered at all stages of their development. The current approach of having security “bolted-on” to the systems that we build is not sufficient. Instead, we need to consider the increasingly critical security requirements for these systems and design them with security “baked-in” so that sufficient evidence to support security assurance claims can be generated and reasoned about alongside the system being developed. ******The overall aim of this research program is to establish comprehensive security assurance solutions by enhancing security-by-design approaches for engineering secure software-dependent systems. More specifically, it aims to develop more incremental, modular, and compositional solutions for securing systems from the outset and for generating sufficient evidence of their built-in resilience to a range of cyber-attacks and failures. This requires the integration of formal (mathematically rigorous) methods and security-by-design approaches to provide verifiable evidence to support security assurance claims from early stages of system development. We will achieve this by: (1) Developing formal modeling and analysis frameworks with which we can provide mathematical proofs of assurance of security properties of software-dependent systems at early stages of development; (2) Establishing system-level security evaluation methods and techniques for understanding and mitigating the risks to system assets posed by identified security vulnerabilities; and (3) Advancing techniques to support the management, evaluation, and presentation of sufficient evidence for developing incremental security assurance cases.******Governments, businesses, and users want to be assured that the cyber systems they use offer adequate protections to mitigate the potential risks and associated losses if they experience an attack or failure. The anticipated outcomes will help in establishingat all stages of system developmentsufficient evidence to provide this assurance. This will contribute to alleviating some of the challenges of reasoning about the security of large and complex software-dependent systems and the high-costs associated with security assurance and certification. This research supports Canada's strategic investment to position itself as a global leader in cybersecurity. The obtained results have the potential to impact and influence the development of standards, regulations, and guidelines pertaining to development, evaluation, and certification practices for high-assurance secure software-dependent systems enabling Canadians to have higher confidence in the cyber systems that underpin their daily lives.