Defending against intentional and non-intentional threats under information asymmetry

2001年9月11日和2017年9月6日将被记住很长一段时间。虽然这两天都发生了财产损失和生命损失，但原因截然不同。9月11日，一群目标明确、意志坚定的恐怖分子对美国发动了一次恶毒的袭击，而9月6日，袭击美国东南部的破坏性飓风“厄玛”则是一种自然行为。恐怖袭击和自然灾害在全球范围内的频率正在增加，加拿大对这些主导世界关注的威胁并不天真。这些灾害的累积效应对个人、社区和各级政府的财政能力造成重大的人身、物质和经济压力。事实上，在（i）加拿大最近发生致命的恐怖袭击（例如2014年10月，加拿大遭受伊斯兰极端分子的两次恐怖袭击）;（ii）加拿大在加拿大境外进行军事干预（例如，反对伊拉克和黎凡特伊斯兰国以及反对达伊沙、胜利阵线和真主党的行动）;及（iii）加拿大最近发生的自然灾害（如2016年5月阿尔伯塔麦克默里堡的野火和2014年6月马尼托巴南部的洪水），这对加拿大政府来说是一个挑战，它需要找到如何在保护免受故意威胁和自然灾害之间取得平衡的办法，国防预算。针对这些问题，本研究旨在了解现有/新出现的故意威胁和自然灾害对政府防御计划的影响。通过以下两个相互关联的模块，我们计划开发一个理论框架，帮助政府优化分配其有限的预算，以应对威胁。首先，基于先进的运筹学技术，特别是信息不对称下的博弈论，我们计划开发模型，使政府能够优先考虑来自故意来源（战略参与者）和自然灾害（机会参与者）的威胁。然后，我们使用先进的优化技术和数学建模来解决防御预算的最佳分配对威胁。鉴于政府预算有限，可能无法缓解所有威胁，在项目的第二个模块中，我们使用激励和机制设计理论来确定可以形成公私合作伙伴关系的机会。在本模块中，我们计划开发一个理论框架，帮助政府分析不同的公共激励措施，以吸引私营部门在安全领域的投资。特别是，我们要研究的直接激励措施（如补贴，安全赠款，或税收抵免）对间接激励措施（如责任保护，培训，捆绑保险）在促进私营部门的安全计划的投资的有效性。

September 11, 2001, and September 6, 2017, will be remembered for a very long time. Though property damage and loss of life occurred on both days, the causes were drastically different. On September 11, a focused and determined group of terrorists executed a vicious attack on the US, whereas, on September 6, the destructive Hurricane Irma that hits Southeastern US was an act of nature. The frequency of terrorist attacks and natural disasters is increasing around the world, and Canada is not naive about these threats that dominate the world's attention. The cumulative effect of these disasters produces a significant personal, material and economic strain on individuals, communities and the fiscal capacity of all levels of governments. Indeed, in the aftermath of (i) the recent deadly terrorist attacks in Canada (such as those on October 2014, in which Canada suffered two terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists); (ii) the Canadian military intervention beyond Canada's borders (e.g., those against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and those against Daesh, Jabhat al-Nusra and Hizballah); and (iii) recent natural disasters in Canada (such as wildfire in Fort McMurray, Alberta in May 2016, and flood in Southern Manitoba in June 2014), it becomes a challenge for the Canadian government finding how to balance protection from intentional threats and natural disasters subject to limited defensive budget. Addressing these concerns, this research aims to understand the impact of existing/emerging intentional threats and natural disasters on the government's defense plan. Through the following two interrelated modules, we plan to develop a theoretical framework that helps the government optimally distribute its limited budget against the threats. First, based on advanced operations research techniques, specifically those of game theory under information asymmetry, we plan to develop models that enable the government to prioritize the threats from both intentional sources (a strategic player) and natural disasters (a player who plays with the chance). We then use advanced techniques in optimization and mathematical modeling to solve for the optimal distribution of defensive budget against the threats. Given the fact that government has a limited budget and may not be able to mitigate all the threats, in the second module of the project, we use the theory of incentives and mechanism design to identify the opportunities where a public-private partnership in security can be formed. In this module, we plan to develop a theoretical framework that helps the government analyze different public incentives to attract private sector investment in security. In particular, we want to study the effectiveness of direct incentives (such as subsidies, security grants, or tax credits) against indirect incentives (such as liability protection, training, bundled insurance) in fostering the private sector's investment in the security programs.