The dual strategy model of reason: Integrating counterexample and probabilistic reasoning

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Reasoning involves making inferences on the basis of given premises and is an important component of advanced cognition. Unfortunately, research has shown that people have real problems being "logical" and often make illogical inferences. Currently, there are two major models of how people reason, mental model theories and probabilistic theories, which suggest very different underlying processes and mechanisms. However, the latest work from my lab suggests that a hybrid model of reasoning, the Dual strategy model, could potentially integrate these various approaches. This model suggests that each of these theories might represent a different form of reasoning strategy, and identifies two such strategies. Counterexample reasoners make inferences by constructing representations of key aspects of a given problem and are sensitive to potential counterexamples. Statistical reasoners use intuitive access to information in order to generate likelihood estimates of possible conclusions. Several studies, using a previously elaborated diagnostic instrument, suggest that people preferentially use one of these two forms of reasoning strategy. This predicts individual differences on a wide variety of reasoning and judgment tasks. This program will continue to examine this model in more detail, in order to provide a stronger empirical base and to determine with more precision what dimensions characterize the strategy distinction. A first set of studies will examine effects of time constraints on reasoning. Previous results suggest that Statistical reasoners are using a complex form of rapid, intuitive processing, which should be relatively impervious to time constraints, while Counterexample reasoners use more working memory intensive processes for which thinking fast should be less logical than thinking slow. A second series of studies are derived from some preliminary results that suggests that Counterexample reasoners are more focused on a restricted subset of available information while Statistical reasoners are more diffuse and attend to a larger array of information, but in a less focused way. This will be examined in a set of correlational studies using both standard and non-standard measures of attention. A third series of studies will examine the potential implications of differing strategy use on academic performance in children. A recent study with adults has shown that strategy use predicts performance over and above cognitive capacity. This suggests that differences in strategy use could be important tool in understanding differences in the underlying way that children and adolescents process academic information. The Dual strategy model of reasoning has shown that it taps into a major distinction in the way that people think, one which has the potential to change our understanding of the variability in human reasoning. The proposed studies will delve deeper into the cognitive, attentional and developmental components of this distinction.