财政收入集权是分税制的重要特征。中央政府加大财政集权的比重后，地方政府会随之调整税收治理行为，包括征管效率（税收努力）与税源培育（税收能力）的改变。在地方政府的税收治理行为下，企业不同税种的实际税率水平会如何变动？是否会进行相应的策略性应对行为，最终对地方政府的税收能力产生影响？对于这一问题目前还没有满意的答案。本课题利用所得税分享改革的准自然实验，研究了在财政集权的背景下，地方政府税收治理与企业实际税负之间的策略性税收互动行为。课题结合了税收征管数据、企业财务数据与地方政府的财政经济数据，在动态与静态的框架下，分析财政集权对企业的实际税率水平与避税行为带来的影响，并对地方政府的差异化税收治理行为与政企之间的税收合谋进行了考察。旨在从财政体制改革的角度为企业供给侧改革提供经验证据，对在“营改增”背景下中央政府如何科学界定财政集权的程度以及引导地方政府税收治理的优化提供一定的政策建议。

Fiscal centralization is an important feature of tax-sharing system. After the central government raised the proportion of fiscal centralization, local governments will change the tax governance behavior accordingly, including the efficiency of tax administration (tax effort) and tax source management (tax capacity). Under this situation, how will corporate tax burden change? Will corporates choose the strategic behavior and affect the tax capacity of local governments eventually? There has no clear answer to this question. This program studies the strategic interaction behavior between local tax governance behavior and corporates tax burden based on the reform of tax-sharing system under the situation of fiscal centralization. Combined with the tax administration data, corporate finance data and economic data of local governments, we study the impact of fiscal centralization on actual tax burden and tax avoidance of corporates under the dynamic and static framework, and investigate the differentiation local tax governance behavior and tax collusion. With these results, the program intends to offer empirical evidence of the supply front reform from the perspective of fiscal system and some political advices on how to settle the fiscal centralization for central government and optimization of local tax governance behavior.