独立董事选聘、提名人偏好与公司治理效应

独立董事选聘对公司治理效应的影响一直是公司治理机制研究的核心话题之一。尽管少量学者发现独立董事治理作用受制于经理人或控股股东，但鲜有运用经验证据从不同提名人选聘动机和偏好视角解释独立董事选聘与公司治理效应之间的关系。本项目立足我国上市公司特殊的制度背景，以《指导意见》的实施和《独董提名人声明》的公告为切入点，研究不同提名人（董事会、经理人、控股股东、非控股股东）的选聘动机以及对独立董事独立性和监督能力的偏好，进而评估偏好差异对公司内外部治理效应的影响。在此基础上，分析产权特征对受聘于不同提名主体的独立董事治理效应的影响。本项目的研究从理论上厘清了独董选聘对公司治理效应的影响机理及结果，拓展了独董选聘的研究范畴，阐释了代理理论、资源支持理论和信号传递理论在我国的运用；在实践上为上市公司优化董事会结构、为中小投资者保护自身权益以及为监管部门制定和改进独董选聘政策提供了理论支持和经验证据。

The impact of the independent directors appointment on the corporate governance effect has always been one of the core topics in the research of corporate governance system. Although few researchers have discovered that the role of independent directors is subject to the appointment of managers or controlling shareholders, there is little empirical evidence to analyze the relationship between the independent director appointment and the corporate governance effect from the perspectives of different nominator motivations and preferences. This project is based on the special institutional background of the listed companies in China, with the implementation of "Guidance Opinions" and the announcement of "Independent Director Nominator Statement" as the breakthrough point to study the appointment motivations of different types of nominators (board, managers, controlling shareholders and non-controlling shareholders) and the preferences for the independence and supervision ability of the independent directors, further to evaluate the influence of the preference difference on the corporate governance effect. On this basis, this project analyzes the impact of the ownership nature of ultimate controller on the governance effect of independent directors who are appointmented by different nominators. The research of this project clarify the impact mechanism and results of the independent directors appointment on the corporate governance effect, expand the research of independent directors appointment, deepen the understanding of the agency theory, resource dependent theory and signaling theory in china, and is practically for the listed companies to optimize the board structure, for minority investors to protect their own interests and for the regulators to formulate and improve the policy of independent directors appointment to provide theoretical support and empirical evidence.