面向信息披露的银行风险承担行为研究

在多种因素的共同作用下，银行最终的风险承担行为是不确定的，它将取决于一系列内、外部条件。本项目基于中国银行业的现实制度背景，研究隐性存款保险制度、资本约束与披露监管并存下的银行信息披露对其风险承担行为的影响，深入剖析基于风险管理的商业银行公司治理机制（风险治理）如何影响银行的信息披露进而影响其风险承担行为以及信息披露的适度性（Moderation）问题；将金融工程中的VaR理论、连续时间金融中的期权定价理论、经济计量中的非平衡面板数据建模与不完全信息动态博弈理论相结合，研究银行与存款人（债权人）、股东、监管部门等利益相关者的行为范式，深刻认知信息披露、风险治理与银行风险承担行为间的相互作用机理与机制。本项目研究对于揭示现实中由信息披露所释放出来的风险信号与银行治理、风险承担行为间的相互作用机理具有重要的理论意义和学术价值，也为监管部门的政策制订提供重要的理论基础与决策支持。

Under corporate effect and impact of various factors, the final risk-taking behaviors of banks, which depend on a series of condintions both from the internal and from the external,are uncertain. This project is based on the reality of the Chinese banking system, and investigates how bank disclosure influences the bank risk-taking behavior under the combinanted impact of the implicit deposit insurance system, of capital constrains and of disclosure regulation.This study thoroughly dissects how bank risk mangement influences bank disclosure,and then affects risk-taking behaviors，and deliberates the problem of moderation of information dislosure. Using VAR theory of financial engineering, option pricing theory of continuous-time finance, unbalanced panel data modeling of econometrics and incomplete information dynamic game theory, the behaviors of banks,depositors,shareholders and regulators are investigated, in order to profoundly acknowledge the interaction mechanism of information disclosure, risk management, and bank risk-taking behaviors. This study has important theoretical significance and academic value to reveal the interaction mechanism between the risk signal released from disclosure, bank managenment and risk-taking behaviors. Moreover, it provides significant theoretial basis and decision support.