中国地方政府的“土地——债务”模式是过去十年中国最引人注目的经济现象。本课题在房地产调控日趋严厉、地方债务风险逐步暴露的背景下，对这一发展模式的内生机制和经济影响进行研究。首先，利用特定监管政策作为“拟自然实验”，通过微观计量方法识别土地与地方债务之间的因果关系。其次，利用土地市场外生波动，考察土地资产（出让收入）对地方债务的影响，并对潜在传导机制进行检验。接下来，从宏观（地方长期经济增长）和微观（微观企业融资、投资、创新行为）两个维度上考察“土地——债务”模式的经济影响。最后，本课题构建一个纳入中国制度特征的动态一般随机模型，分析这一增长模式的内在机制，进而对相关政策和潜在风险进行“反事实”模拟。本课题的研究不仅丰富和发展了地方政府财政理论，还为中央政府在地方政府“去杠杆”过程中防范和化解系统性金融风险，最终实现中国经济向高质量发展阶段转变的目标提供了重要的实践启示。

Chinese Local Government’s “Land-Debt” Development mode is the most striking economic phenomenon of China in the last decade. Under this background, our project is going to investigate the endogenous mechanism and economic impact of this development mode. Firstly, we use certain supervisory policy as “quasi natural experiment” to identify the causality relationship between land and local government debt. Next, based on the microdata, we investigate the transmission mechanism of land asset (revenue) on local government debt by exploiting the exogenous land market fluctuation. Thirdly, we investigate both the microeconomic consequence (the firm’s borrowing, investment and R&D) and macroeconomic consequence (long-term local economic growth) of “Land-Debt” mode. Finally, we construct a DSGE model embedded with Chinese institutional features, and analyze the dynamic mechanism and conduct “counter-factual” simulation for policy adjustment and potential risk in this model..Our research project not only develops the local government fiscal theory, but also provide important practice inspiration in preventing and mitigating systemic financial risks during the "deleverage process " of the local government and ultimately achieving the goal of transforming China's economy into a high-quality development phase.