合作系统的演化和维持机制一直是生物学家、社会和经济学家关心和研究的重要问题。经典合作演化理论都暗含合作双方相互作用的对称性以及系统中奖惩实施方具有识别投机个体能力（惩罚不合作个体，奖励合作个体）的前提假设，但越来越多的证据表明大多合作系统中合作双方处于一种非对称性相互关系，并且个体不具备识别能力，而此时的奖惩行为将针对每个个体而不是针对某个具体个体，即具有集体性。考虑到现实合作系统中集体奖惩机制的存在以及非对称相互关系，本项目拟以理论建模与实验生态学、实验经济学相结合的方法，运用博弈论中非对称性原理、微分/差分方程理论及统计理论建立数学模型，并结合计算机模拟，探讨集体性奖惩机制对非对称合作系统演化的作用，试图揭示非对称系统中合作行为的演化动力、系统维持机制及稳定性条件。该研究将会为不具识别能力非对称合作系统的稳定维持提供理论解释，并可能对生态保护、企业与市场行为等领域的研究提供一定的启示。

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation is a fundamental scientific problem that has yet to be fully resolved. The classical theories are based on assumption that partners interact symmetrically and dominant individuals have cognitive abilities to discern cooperators and non-cooperators. However, it was found that the interaction are often asymmetric and many organisms do not have the capacities to discriminate less cooperating individuals in most real cooperation systems. As a result, punishment or reward behavior is usually imposed on all players rather than specific defectors or cooperators. This project will combine mathematical model, experimental ecology and experimental economics methods to explore how the collective punishment\reward and the asymmetric interaction together affect the evolution of cooperation and its stability. Based on this research, we will provide a theoretical explanation for cooperation stability of the asymmetric systems when individuals do not show signs of using any discrimination process. Our work may provide some inspiration for understanding market behavior, ecological conservation, and other fields.