我国审计定价政策从2010年的价格管制到2014年放开，均未能有效抑制审计市场低价竞争。资本市场信息不对称，导致政府或市场不能有效地调节审计服务的价格。使用审计后的财务指标解释审计前决定的审计收费，有失偏颇，忽略了审计程序有效性受限于审计前双方先决议定的审计收费；分析单一政策效果，未同时考虑审计定价管制和放开政策的溢出效应。研究：（1）嵌入双边随机边界模型的审计定价机理；（2）审计收费对审计程序（重要性、控制测试与实质性程序）和投入（工时和人数）的影响；（3）审计定价政策变更（管制或放开）下,审计收费对公司治理和资本市场的溢出效应。研究有助于厘清审计定价机理，探索资本市场公开信息集与审计师和客户双方私有信息集对定价的影响。拓展审计收费先决情况下，审计收费对审计程序与投入，进而对质量的影响，探讨审计定价政策变更对市场的溢出效应，有助于有关部门制定监管措施。

Audit pricing policies, no matter the regulation from 2010 to 2014 or the liberalization from 2014 until now, fail to effectively restrain the price competition among accounting firms in China. The information asymmetry in capital market leads to the failure of government or market to effectively regulate the audit price. Using audited financial measures to explain the audit fees decided before auditing is biased. It ignores that the effectiveness of audit procedures and inputs is limited by the audit fees bargained by both parties before auditing; analyzing the effects of a single policy, without considering the spillover effect of audit price regulation and liberalization together.Thus, we explore: (1) Audit pricing mechanism embedded in bilateral stochastic boundary model; (2) The impact of audit fees on audit procedures (importance, test of control and substantive procedures) and inputs (man-hour and number of auditors); (3) The spillover effects of audit fees on corporate governance and capital markets under the condition that audit price policy changes (regulation or liberalization). The research helps to clarify audit pricing mechanism, explore the impact of the public information set of the capital market and the private information set of auditors and clients on audit pricing. We also research the impact of audit fees on audit procedures and inputs, and then on audit quality when audit fees are decided before implementation of audit procedure in practice. Further, we explore the spillover effects of audit pricing policy changes on the market, which helps relevant supervisory departments to formulate regulatory measures.