中国证券分析师荐股行为监管与中小投资者保护

课题以中国证券分析师荐股行为监管及中小投资者保护作为研究主线，通过跨期动态行为模型剖析证券分析师荐股策略空间和行为仿真模拟，对证券分析师发布研究报告和荐股行为进行解析，检验中国证券分析师研究报告质量和荐股行为有效性、信息含量及其市场效应，以此解答中国证券分析师能否承担提升市场效率和信息透明度、引导市场理性投资和价值投资的重要使命。在此基础上，从知情交易和机构投资者交易的视角解析卖方分析师荐股行为的利益冲突机制，揭示中国证券分析师发布研究报告行为和利益冲突机制问题诱因，论证中国证券分析师荐股行为异化的背后利益冲突机制和情绪驱动机制，试图破解证券分析师荐股利益冲突这一全球性监管难题，进而构建中国证券分析师行为治理与监管新框架，矫正荐股异化行为和消除证券研究行业"潜规则"，从而为提升证券市场效率、强化利益冲突监管和提高中小投资者权益保护水平、推动我国证券研究行业新秩序建立提供金融学证据。

Based on the behavior of issued analyst stock recommendation and protection of Small and medium inveators, the research analyzes the strategy and simulates the behavior of stock recommendations from China securities analysts using the methodology of intertemporal dynamic model of behavioral finance To see whether the securities analysts in China could take the mission to enhance the market efficiency and information transparency, and at the same time conduct rational and value investment, we test the validity, information contents, and market effects of their research reports and stock recommendations. On the basis of above, we also analyzes the interests conflicts of sell-side analysts through a view of informed trading and institutional investment, meanwhile revealing the cause of the problem. Besides, reasoning the interests conflicts and emotional driving mechanism behind the alienation of analysts stock recommendation is also a part of our work. By doing so , we attempt to solve the world-wide regulatory problem of interests conflicts of analysts' stock recommendations and so to construct a new governance and regulatory framework for China securities analysts, correcting their alienated behavior and dismissing the unspoken rules of the securities research industry. Our work will provide financial academic accordance to improve the market efficiency, consolidate the regulatory for interests conflicts, enhance the protection of small investors and finally setup the new order of China securities research industry.